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Notes
Policing the Police: Balancing the Right to Privacy
Against the Beneficial Use of Drone Technology
JENNIFER M. BENTLEY†
The cost of buying, operating, and maintaining manned aircraft traditionally limited the
government’s ability to conduct widespread aerial surveillance. But drone technology is eroding
this natural limit because they are cheaper, stealthier, and can be used as a platform for other
powerful surveillance tools. Drones are ideally suited for numerous law enforcement tasks such
as search and rescue, crime scene investigations, and gaining a bird’s-eye view in dangerous
active shooter or hostage situations. Privacy rights advocates fear that drone capabilities are
bringing us closer to a “surveillance society” in which our every move is monitored, recorded,
and scrutinized by the government, and have led the fight to either require police to obtain a
warrant before using a drone or to ban the use of drones altogether. At the federal government
level, only the FAA regulates drones but the Agency considers privacy outside the scope of its
authority. Approximately one-third of states require law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior
to using a drone to conduct a search or surveillance. A handful of local governments have
banned the use of drones by law enforcement entirely in response to privacy concerns. However,
overly broad restrictions on drone use have an unintended consequence in that they also curtail
non-invasive, beneficial uses of drones. The Fourth Amendment likely does not protect
individuals from warrantless drone surveillance provided the drone does not physically trespass
and only captures what is visible from public airspace. This Note considers the twin harms of a
surveillance society and depriving law enforcement of the beneficial uses of drones and
concludes that states, as the laboratories of democracy, must act to reign in the use of unmanned
aircraft by law enforcement so that public backlash against the threat to privacy does not result
in the total deprivation of this useful technology.

†
J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Articles Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. The Author gratefully acknowledges Professor Eumi K. Lee for her invaluable feedback
and suggestions and the Notes team for their diligent efforts. This Note is dedicated to Robert Whitburn for his
unflagging support and to my family who listened to me drone on about privacy for months.
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INTRODUCTION
Drones are swiftly gaining popularity in the United States. In 2016, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated there were already 2.5 million
drones being flown regularly in the United States, with that number expected to
rise to 7 million by 2020.1 Drones are cheaper, smaller, and stealthier than
traditional piloted aircraft, making them a popular tool in the hands of law
enforcement2 and raising concerns for privacy advocates.3 In light of this new
technology, it is vital to balance the public’s privacy interests against the
numerous beneficial applications of drone technology.4
In the hands of law enforcement, drones can be used in a variety of ways
which range from innocuous to highly invasive. For example, drones are
uniquely capable of assisting with search and rescue operations, accident
reconstruction, crime scene investigation, and providing a bird’s eye view in
dangerous active shooter or hostage situations.5 However, drones are also potent
tools that can be used to invade privacy and conduct highly intrusive
surveillance.6 Because the use of drone surveillance implicates the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, clear guidelines are
essential to ensuring the continued and effective use of the powerful
technology.7 In fact, public suspicion and fear surrounding the use of drones by
law enforcement has led some municipalities to close the door on all drone use,
thus denying local agencies a beneficial tool that could assist in rapidly evolving
or dangerous situations.8
Clear, strict mandates for permissible use of drones by law enforcement are
necessary to ensure continued access for beneficial purposes and to safeguard
privacy rights. All levels of government have attempted to regulate law
1. Kelsey D. Atherton, The FAA Says There Will Be 7 Million Drones Flying over America by 2020
POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.popsci.com/new-faa-report-stares-in-face-drone-filled-future. The
Author was unable to locate predictions for the number of law enforcement drones by 2020, but the FAA
forecasts that two percent of the estimated 2.7 million commercial (non-hobbyist) drones by that time will belong
to the government. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST FISCAL YEARS 2016–2036, at 31, 33,
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/FY201636_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
2. Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Guidebook
in
Development,
COMMUNITY
POLICING
DISPATCH
(Aug.
2014)
https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/08-2014/uas_guidebook_in_development.asp [hereinafter Unmanned
Aircraft Systems].
3. See Michael J. Schoen & Michael A. Tooshi, Confronting the New Frontier in Privacy Rights:
Warrantless Unmanned Aerial Surveillance, 25 AIR & SPACE L., no. 3, 2012, at 2.
4. Id. at 19.
5. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 2.
6. Schoen & Tooshi, supra note 3, at 18 (noting that drones have greater potential to invade privacy than
manned aircraft and can be outfitted with sophisticated surveillance technology).
7. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983) (recognizing that if Respondent’s argument
that twenty-four-hour surveillance of citizens “without judicial knowledge or supervision” comes to fruition,
there may be a need to reexamine whether “different constitutional principles may be applicable”).
8. See, e.g., Christine Clarridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES,
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-grounds-police-drone-program (last updated Feb. 8, 2013,
8:52 AM).
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enforcement’s use of drones. Federal actions thus far have failed,9 but eighteen
states have passed laws regulating drone use and attempting to protect
individuals from warrantless surveillance or searches.10 At least a half-dozen
local governments have also enacted ordinances regulating law enforcement use
of drones.11
Where the legislature is silent, courts are left to interpret whether current
Fourth Amendment doctrine protects individuals from warrantless drone
surveillance. There is a noticeable absence of case law examining the
constitutionality of drone surveillance, but lower courts applying Fourth
Amendment doctrine to similar surveillance issues are reaching inconsistent
results.12 These opinions demonstrate a lack of clear consensus. While the
Supreme Court typically does adapt to emerging technologies and often decides
in favor of individual rights,13 it is usually a slow process and a case involving
drone surveillance is unlikely to reach the high court for many years.14 For these
reasons, states should enact laws providing law enforcement with clear, strict
guidelines for drone usage that protect individual privacy and preserve this
technology as a valuable tool in local law enforcement’s arsenal.
Part I of this Note presents an overview of drone capabilities, detailing how
law enforcement is currently using the technology, with a focus on how the
relatively low cost of drones is eroding a natural limit on law enforcement’s prior
use of aerial surveillance. Part I also surveys various attempts to regulate drone
usage by federal, state, and local actors.
Part II provides a brief overview of the Court’s current aerial surveillance
and high-tech surveillance jurisprudence and then explores how lower courts are
interpreting and applying these doctrines. Because the Court has not considered
an aerial surveillance case for almost thirty years (prior to the advent of drones),
the doctrine is ill-suited to the twenty-first century.15 And even though the Court
has more recently decided high-tech surveillance cases,16 current Fourth
9. See infra Subpart I.D.1.
10. 2017 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) State Legislation Update, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/2017-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-statelegislation-update.aspx [hereinafter 2017 UAS State Legislation Update].
11. ARTHUR HOLLAND MICHEL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE, LOCAL AND STATE DRONE LAWS 2
(2017), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/state-and-local-drone-laws.
12. See infra Subpart II.C.
13. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–20 (2018) (holding that the government’s
acquisition of cell-site location information constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
14. For an example of the Supreme Court’s slow response to emerging technology, see United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012) (noting that the Court’s position on wiretaps evolved from holding in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that wiretaps did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, to
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), where the Court held an eavesdropping device in a public
telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment). Indeed, while Jones effectuated a major shift in recognizing
that the Fourth Amendment protects people, and not places, this shift took nearly four decades.
15. The last aerial surveillance case the Court decided was Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
16. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (involving cell-site location information); Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(involving GPS monitoring); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (involving thermal imaging
technology).
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Amendment doctrine alone is insufficient to address the technological
developments that could lead to widespread surveillance. Part II also considers
the flawed logic in police department policies and statutes that expressly require
law enforcement to obtain a warrant before using drones when required by the
Fourth Amendment, given the fact that the applicability of the warrant
requirement in this context remains unsettled.
In Part III, this Note proposes that state legislatures are in the best position
to expediently enact laws that balance the public safety benefits of drone use
against privacy. Specifically, states can and should experiment with how best to
safeguard privacy interests, but all such legislation should include: (1) specific
parameters for the circumstances under which law enforcement may use drones;
(2) limits on data retention; (3) a policy that renders data collected in violation
of the statute inadmissible; and (4) limits on sense-enhancing technology that
may be placed on a drone.
I. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION TO DRONES
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),17 or, unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
are unpiloted aircraft or spacecraft, more commonly known as drones.18 UAV is
the term for the vehicle itself, while UAS refers to the entire system, which is
comprised of the vehicle, ground control station with pilot, communications, and
support.19 UAS are used by the military, government, and law enforcement
because they present benefits over piloted aircraft since they neither risk the lives
of pilots, nor do the drones need rest.20
Drones are also used by non-governmental actors, from hobbyists to
commercial enterprises. Flying drones as a hobby is gaining in popularity, with
an estimated 1.5 million hobby drones in the United States in 2016.21 Moreover,
commercial companies are developing and testing drones to deliver everything

17. Elizabeth Howell, What Is a Drone? SPACE.COM (Oct. 3, 2018, 2:32 PM),
https://www.space.com/29544-what-is-a-drone.html.
18. The FAA refers to drones as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Frequently Asked Questions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/faqs (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
19. What Is the Difference Between a UAV and UAS?, DART DRONES (Jan. 27, 2016),
https://www.dartdrones.com/blog/difference-between-uav-and-uas.
20. Id.; see also Josh Reyes, Drones Becoming More Common in Peninsula Law Enforcement, Fire and
Rescue Agencies, DAILY PRESS (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:15 PM), http://www.dailypress.com/news/york-county/dpnws-evg-york-county-sheriff-fire-drone-20171206-story.html (describing how a drone can assist local police
officers by providing information and visuals in situations where a subject is barricaded in a building without
endangering officers).
21. Atherton, supra note 1.
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from packages22 and pizza23 to blood and pathology samples.24 Farmers are
using drones to gain an aerial view of crops and to better analyze the
effectiveness of their growing processes.25 Scientists use drones to conduct
research, such as measuring climate change, studying atmospheric conditions
during solar eclipses, and monitoring the health of the rainforest in the
Amazon.26
Drones can be as large as traditional, manned aircraft27 or as small as
hummingbirds.28 Smaller versions are both lightweight and highly agile,29 able
to maneuver quietly into tight spaces.30 A hobbyist illustrated the unprecedented
agility and capability of these aircraft to penetrate even the most sacred of spaces
when he landed a $400 remote-controlled helicopter on the White House
grounds in 2015.31 Researchers at universities and technology companies
continue to advance drone technology, improving modes of flight, flight range,
endurance, and carrying capacity.32 For example, university researchers
developed a small drone that “flies like a bat,” which could potentially lead to
“aircraft that are lighter, quieter and have a longer endurance.”33 By virtue of

22. See,
e.g.,
Amazon
Prime
Air,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-PrimeAir/b?node=8037720011 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
23. David Reid, Domino’s Delivers World’s First Ever Pizza by Drone, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/16/dominos-has-delivered-the-worlds-first-ever-pizza-by-drone-to-a-newzealand-couple.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2016, 9:02 AM).
24. Matternet Unveils the Matternet Station, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/matternet-unveils-the-matternet-station-300522496.html.
25. Press Release, AeroVironment, AeroVironment Automated Quantix Hybrid Drone and AV Decision
Support System Now Available; A Powerfully Simple-to-Use and Fully Integrated Drone and Data Processing
Solution Delivering Actionable Intelligence for the Farm (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.avinc.com/resources/
press-releases/view/aerovironment-automated-quantix-hybrid-drone-and-av-decision-support-system.
26. DAN GETTINGER & ARTHUR HOLLAND MICHEL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE, DRONE YEAR IN
REVIEW: 2017, at 13 (2018), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/drone-year-in-review-2017.
27. For example, the U.S. Navy’s Triton UAS has a 130-foot wingspan and would “provide high-altitude,
real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” for up to twenty-four hours at a time. Allen McDuffee,
Navy’s 757-Sized Drone Will Provide Big-Time Surveillance, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014, 1:37 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/01/triton.
28. W.J. Hennigan, It’s a Bird! It’s a Spy! It’s Both, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/17/business/la-fi-hummingbird-drone-20110217
(reporting on
the
development of a drone with the appearance of a hummingbird).
29. Id. (noting that the “hummingbird-like” drone is equipped with a video camera, weighs less than a AA
battery, and is able to “hover and fly sideways, backward and forward, as well as go clockwise and
counterclockwise”).
30. Drones in Surveillance and Security, JETLABS, http://jetlabs.info/applications/surveillance-andsecurity (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
31. Kevin Poulsen, Why the US Government Is Terrified of Hobbyist Drones, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:15
AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/02/white-house-drone. Following the incident, where the hobbyist
reportedly lost control of the helicopter, the manufacturer of the popular aircraft voluntarily pushed out a
mandatory firmware update for the model which would prevent it from flying within a 15.5-mile radius of the
White House. This term is called geofencing, and is not foolproof, as it is likely still prone to hacking. Id.
32. GETTINGER & MICHEL, supra note 26, at 12–13.
33. Id. at 12.
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their design, size, and unique flight capabilities, UAS “can operate undetected
in urban and rural environments.”34
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT DRONE CAPABILITIES AND TYPICAL USES
Because drones have unique capabilities, are affordable, and can be
operated without risk of harm to the pilot, law enforcement agencies are
increasingly turning to UAS to provide them with aerial views.35 Whereas the
cost of buying, operating, and maintaining manned aircraft traditionally limited
the government’s ability to conduct aerial surveillance on a widespread or
regular basis, drones are rapidly changing the equation.36 According to the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), “[n]ow that surveillance can be carried
out by unmanned aircraft, this natural limit is eroding.”37 Prior to implementing
UAS, police could only gain an aerial view by using helicopters38 or airplanes.39
Manned aircraft were not a feasible option for many law enforcement agencies,
except in rare situations. Helicopters are not widely available,40 are costly to
operate and maintain, and are too noisy to use in sensitive situations.41 In
contrast to a helicopter or plane that comes with a price tag of $500,000 to
$3,000,0000,42 drones can cost as little as $2,000,43 travel in excess of 100 miles

34. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/drones (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
35. See Schoen & Tooshi, supra note 3, at 1, 2.
36. JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE:
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
GOVERNMENT
USE
OF
DRONE
AIRCRAFT
1
(2011),
https://www.aclu.org/report/protecting-privacy-aerial-surveillance-recommendations-government-use-droneaircraft.
37. Id.
38. Drones in Surveillance and Security, supra note 30.
39. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (law enforcement used private plane to conduct
aerial surveillance of suspect’s backyard); People v. Mayoff, 729 P.2d 166, 173 n.5 (Cal. 1986) (plane that
discovered marijuana cultivation flew over the property on two occasions at an altitude of 1,000 feet).
40. Drones in Surveillance and Security, supra note 30.
41. Id.
42. Jay Stanley, We Already Have Police Helicopters, So What’s the Big Deal over Drones?, ACLU: FREE
FUTURE (Mar. 8, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/we-already-have-policehelicopters-so-whats-big-deal-over-drones. Not only do manned aircraft cost more to acquire, they cost 200 to
800 dollars-per-hour to operate and require highly trained pilots, co-pilots, ground crew, and runways or
helipads. Id.; see also Skyler Swisher, Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office to Receive $1M in State Funding for
Drone Program, SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 18, 2016, 5:30 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/palm-beach/flpalm-sheriff-drones-20160318-story.html (stating it costs about 800 dollars per hour to operate one of its manned
ships).
43. The most popular drones for public safety use are the DJI Phantom and DJI Inspire, which start at 2,000
dollars or less. See DAN GETTINGER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE, DRONES AT HOME: PUBLIC SAFETY
DRONES 3, 4 (2017), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/public-safety-drones; see also Inspire 1 V2.0, DJI STORE,
https://store.dji.com/product/inspire-1-v2?site=brandsite (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (offering the Inspire 1 V.20
model for 1,999 dollars); Phantom 4 Pro V2.0, DJI STORE, https://store.dji.com/product/phantom-4-prov2?pbc=Ph17Whbx&utm_source=performancehorizon&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=phantom-4pro&Phclickrefb=1100l5EsJrfq&vid=43151 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (DJI Phantom 4 Pro V2.0 model costs
1,499 dollars); Michael De Yoanna, How Mesa County Used Drones in Search and Rescue Efforts After
Landslide, COLO. PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2014), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/how-mesa-county-used-drones-
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per hour,44 and allow first responders to arrive on scene faster45 and go
unnoticed.46 For law enforcement, the relatively low cost of UAS adds to their
appeal. For example, the DJI Matrice 600 has a base price of $4,999,47 but when
outfitted “with all its bells and whistles [extra batteries which allow it to fly up
to twelve hours and camera], costs about $25,000.”48
A 2017 study showed exponential growth, finding that 347 state and local
police, sheriff, fire, and emergency units have acquired drones since 2009, with
more units acquired in 2016 than in all previous years combined.49 Drones
enable police to have an “eye in the sky,” able to fly continuously for up to
twenty-four hours with real-time monitoring from the ground.50 Not only are
drones within most law enforcement budgets, departments can even fund their
acquisition through grants from the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”),51 donations,52 or civil forfeiture funds.53 Drones also put aerial
surveillance within the reach of smaller departments that would not have
resources to conduct manned aerial missions. Of the 347 known departments
that have acquired drones, almost half served populations of 50,000 people or
less.54 Indeed, a department serving a small community is unlikely to have the
search-and-rescue-efforts-after-landslide (describing how drones can be deployed at a “much lower cost” than
helicopters).
44. Swisher, supra note 42.
45. Joe Fisher, All the Buzz: How Drones Are Keeping Communities Safe, WAVY-TV (June 12, 2017, 8:29
AM), http://wavy.com/2017/06/12/all-the-buzz-how-drones-are-keeping-the-communities-safe.
46. Jeff Brown, Taking to the Air: Drones and Law Enforcement, DOVER POST (Dec. 13, 2017, 7:40 AM),
http://www.doverpost.com/news/20171213/taking-to-air-drones-and-law-enforcement.
47. Matrice 600 Pro, DJI STORE, https://store.dji.com/product/matrice-600-pro (last visited Nov. 21,
2018).
48. Reyes, supra note 20. DJI supplies sixty-eight percent of all drones to public safety agencies in the
United States. Sidney Fussell, Who Will Police Police Drones?, GIZMODO (July 11, 2018, 12:40 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/who-will-police-police-drones-1826891119.
49. GETTINGER, supra note 43, at 3. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation admits to using drones
for surveillance on U.S. soil, such use appears to be minimal, therefore, this Note focuses on use by state and
local law enforcement. SARA LOVE, ACLU OF MD., SURVEILLANCE IN THE FREE STATE: ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS, LOCATION TRACKING, AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS, DRONES AND FACIAL
RECOGNITION 11 (2014) (on file with author).
50. Reyes, supra note 20; see also Swisher, supra note 42 (reporting flight times of up to twenty-four hours
per mission).
51. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2008–2015 LAW ENFORCEMENT TERRORISM
PREVENTION ACTIVITY FUNDING (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/124176; see
also Kimberly Dvorak, Homeland Security Increasingly Lending Drones to Local Police, WASH. TIMES (Dec.
10, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/10/homeland-security-increasingly-loaningdrones-to-l (discussing the Department of Homeland Security’s distribution of four million dollars in grants to
local law enforcement agencies for drone purchases). For an overview of how local law enforcement agencies
are able to obtain surveillance technology, often without elected leaders’ and the public’s awareness, through
federal procurement, see Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1595, 1608 (2016).
52. The New York State Trooper Foundation donated sixteen drones to support New York State Police.
Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, N.Y. State, Governor Cuomo Announces Deployment of First
State Police Aerial Drone Systems (Jan. 10, 2018), https://on.ny.gov/2qQynQB.
53. GETTINGER, supra note 43, at 5.
54. Id. at 3.
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resources for manned aircraft. For example, one small county in Virginia55 has
three drones in its arsenal of tools to dispatch in emergency situations.56 The
county’s sheriff’s office and fire department teamed up to man a twelve-person
team, which operates out of a mobile command center housed in a trailer.57 Each
drone carries both an optical zoom camera that allows first responders to see
details when the drone is up to a quarter mile away from its target, and another
with thermal imaging that the team says allows it to see through smoke during
fires and through trees during search and rescue operations.58 “York County’s
never getting a helicopter,” said one fire official. “But we can do this.”59
The main utility of UAS for law enforcement is derived from serving as a
platform for surveillance technology.60 Drones can be outfitted with cameras
with zoom lenses, infrared thermal imagers, wireless network sniffers to
intercept cell phone calls,61 license plate readers, and laser radar.62 These tools
allow police to record and stream high-quality video, penetrate passwordprotected Wi-Fi networks, and record phone conversations and text messages.63
Thermal imagers allow police to “see” heat signals through walls, trees, or
smoke in real-time.64 License plate readers scan and store the plate number, date,
time and GPS location of vehicles.65
With the increased access, law enforcement agencies are using UAS for a
variety of purposes: to survey damage and search for survivors following natural

55. York County, Virginia covers 106 square miles and has 67,837 residents. YORK CTY. VA. ECON. DEV.,
https://www.yesyorkcounty.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). While York County’s population exceeds 50,000,
it is characterized as a “small county” by the U.S. Census Bureau because its population is less than 500,000.
Haya El Nasser, More than Half of U.S. Population in 4.6 Percent of Counties, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 24,
2017), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/10/big-and-small-counties.html.
56. Fisher, supra note 45.
57. Id.
58. Id. (“You can be a quarter of a mile out with that camera on it, with that lens and get as detailed as you
want to without having to be over top of them.” (comment of Deputy Ron Montgomery)). Thermal imaging is
not only useful for seeing through smoke in fires, but also for seeing through walls based on the level of heat
projected by objects. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 3 (2013).
59. Reyes, supra note 20.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See THOMPSON II, supra note 58; see also Angela Woodall, Alameda County Sheriff Plans to Buy a
Surveillance Drone, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012, 12:18 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/
2012/10/19/alameda-county-sheriff-plans-to-buy-a-surveillance-drone.
63. Andy Greenberg, Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell Phones, FORBES (July 28,
2011, 2:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/07/28/flying-drone-can-crack-wifinetworks-snoop-on-cell-phones/#40d4e4707856; Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
64. Zenmuse-XT, DJI, https://www.dji.com/zenmuse-xt (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
65. Lyndsay Winkley, 8 Ways Police Can Spy on Crime, and You, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 21,
2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-police-technology-devices-surveillance-privacy2015may21-story.html.
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disasters,66 take photos and reconstruct crime scenes,67 reconstruct accidents,68
locate missing persons,69 gain a bird’s eye view in active shooter situations,70
apprehend suspects,71 scout homes prior to serving high-risk search warrants,72
and monitor railroad tracks for trespassers.73 In natural disasters or search and
rescue operations, drones can be used in situations where it would be too risky
to send in officers or volunteers.74 For example, when a body was spotted in the
Ohio River and it was running too swiftly to send rescuers, police used a UAV
instead.75 The drone recorded such high-quality video of the body that the
victim’s family was able to identify it by the tattoo markings, even though the
body was never recovered.76 Thus, where a manned recovery was impossible,
the use of drone technology was able to provide the victim’s family with
closure.77
UAS are also uniquely well-suited to assist with photographing crime
scenes and reconstructing accidents. As of April 2018, New York State Police
had eighteen drones for use in reconstructing accidents and documenting crime
scenes.78 According to Governor Andrew M. Cuomo’s office, UAS can
document and reconstruct serious motor vehicle accidents in less time than other
methods, reducing the time that roads are closed for investigation.79 The
Governor predicted that UAS “will improve emergency response, improve

66. De Yoanna, supra note 43.
67. Nancy Lofholm, Look to the Skies in Mesa County for the Police Drone Frontier, DENVER POST (Oct.
19, 2013, 1:50 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2013/10/19/look-to-the-skies-in-mesa-county-for-the-policedrone-frontier.
68. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 52.
69. See, e.g., Chris Aadland, Catching Up: Madison Police Say Using Drones Has Helped the Department,
WIS. ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2018), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/ask/catching-up/catching-up-madisonpolice-say-using-drones-has-helped-the/article_8ff0c737-227f-564f-9287-20ad3bb5271e.html.
70. L.A. POLICE DEP’T, SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM PILOT PROGRAM DEPLOYMENT GUIDELINES
AND
PROCEDURES
3
(2017),
http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/2017.10.17%20%20APPROVED%20FINAL%20-%20sUAS%20Guidelines.pdf.
71. See Lofholm, supra note 67; see also Joe Douglass, ACLU Raises Privacy Concerns After Sheriff’s
Office Exhibits Drone on Facebook, KATU NEWS (July 17, 2017), http://katu.com/news/local/aclu-raisesprivacy-concerns-after-sheriffs-office-exhibits-drone-on-facebook.
72. Grant Schulte, Nebraska Bill Would Criminalize Drone Use to Spy on People, Harass Cows, INS. J.
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2018/01/08/476599.htm.
73. Chris Chase, Brunswick Council Gets First Look at Police Policy on Drone Use, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/01/16/brunswick-council-gets-first-look-at-policepolicy-on-drone-use.
74. See, e.g., De Yoanna, supra note 43 (reporting that drones “played a key role in an exhaustive search”
to recover the bodies of three men after a massive landslide). York County has used its drones to monitor storm
damage and says the thermal imaging will help it see through smoke and trees to aid in search in rescue
operations. Fisher, supra note 45.
75. Margaret Smykla, Game of Drones: Eyes in the Sky Can Be Functional, Fun to Fly, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE
(Mar.
22,
2018,
9:41
AM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/business/technews/2018/03/22/Drones-recreational-commercial-David-Uhrinek/stories/201803150003.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 52.
79. Id.
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operational and cost efficiencies and increase Trooper safety.”80 In other
localities, drones are being used to shoot crime scene video, which is used not
only for investigations,81 but also to allow jurors to view scenes in their entirety,
rather than in still photos.82
C. PUBLIC RESPONSE/BACKLASH TO SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES
Given the capabilities of drones, routine aerial surveillance would
profoundly alter the character of life in the United States.83 Privacy advocates
like the ACLU,84 the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) have warned that drones are capable of
virtually eliminating privacy and creating a surveillance society.85 When people
know the government is watching, they alter their behavior and self-censor.86
And with good reason—a 2010 ACLU study detailed how “Americans have
been put under surveillance or harassed . . . just for deciding to organize, march,
protest, espouse unusual viewpoints and engage in normal, innocuous behaviors
such as writing notes or taking photographs in public.”87 The technical
capabilities of drones and their threat to privacy should not be evaluated as a
single tool, but as they fit into the larger picture of surveillance and information
gathering.88 Law enforcement’s use of drones also poses the threat of “mission
creep” which is using the technology for purposes other than what was originally
proposed.89 “Once a surveillance and data storage infrastructure is in place,
however, the temptation to use it for other purposes can prove irresistible.”90
In 2011, the ACLU published a report on drone use calling for “a system
of rules to ensure that we can enjoy the benefits of this technology without
bringing us a large step closer to a ‘surveillance society’ in which our every
move is monitored, tracked, recorded, and scrutinized by the authorities,” and
outlining specific recommendations for use by law enforcement.91 At the time
80. Id. (quoting Governor Cuomo).
81. Douglass, supra note 71.
82. Lofholm, supra note 67.
83. STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 36, at 1.
84. Id.
85. Dvorak, supra note 51.
86. In a 2016 study, participants who were aware of government surveillance of their social media posts
were significantly less likely to express a minority opinion. Elizabeth Stoycheff, Under Surveillance: Examining
Facebook’s Spiral of Silence Effects in the Wake of NSA Internet Monitoring, 93 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM.
Q. 296, 307 (2016).
87. David Kravets, ACLU Study Highlights U.S. Surveillance Society, WIRED (June 29, 2010, 4:38 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2010/06/aclu-surveillance/ (quoting ACLU attorney Michael German); see also
ACLU, POLICING FREE SPEECH: POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND OBSTRUCTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT‐PROTECTED
ACTIVITY (2010), https://www.aclu.org/report/policing-free-speech-police-surveillance-and-obstruction-firstamendment-protected-activity.
88. Fussell, supra note 48.
89. Id.
90. Mission Creep, THEY ARE WATCHING, https://theyarewatching.org/issues/mission-creep (last visited
Nov. 21, 2018).
91. STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 36, at 1, 15–16.
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of the report, only a handful of police departments were even testing drones.92
However, the ACLU feared that the “prospect of cheap, small, portable flying
video surveillance machines” had the potential “to eradicate existing practical
limits on aerial monitoring and allow for pervasive surveillance [and] police
fishing expeditions.”93 Since then, the ACLU has continued to advocate for
“local laws to require a public, transparent, and democratic process before police
departments can acquire new surveillance technologies or military
equipment.”94 The ACLU favors regulation of all surveillance technology at the
local level and believes the public should have input into when and how law
enforcement uses such technology.95
The EFF is drawing attention to the threat drones pose to privacy interests
through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. In 2012, the EFF sued the
U.S. Department of Transportation demanding the FAA release data about who
specifically had obtained authorizations to fly drones above 400 feet in altitude
and for what purposes.96 This suit led to the public’s first realization of the
FAA’s licensing process for UAV and the privacy and surveillance concerns
surrounding drone use.97 The media widely covered the release of information,
which resulted in some people learning for the first time that their local police
department had drones.98 EPIC has similarly filed FOIA lawsuits against the
DHS seeking the release of information about the Agency’s use of drones for
domestic surveillance.99
Despite strong community opposition, the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) is now the largest department in the country with a drone program after
its Police Commission approved a year-long test program in 2017.100 The LAPD
first began considering drone use in 2014 when it was gifted two high-powered
drones.101 At that time, public opposition was strong enough to keep the drones
92. Id. at 7–8.
93. Id. at 1.
94. Kade Crockford, Boston Police Bought Three Drones but Didn’t Tell Anyone. We Need Accountability
for Surveillance Now., ACLU (Sept. 27, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/boston-police-bought-three-drones-didnt-tell.
95. Community Control over Police Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance?redirect=feature/
community-control-over-police-surveillance (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). Similarly, the ACLU of Washington
favors regulation of drones at the local level and believes that “the acquisition of such technology should be
driven by policies and decisions made with public input.” Clarridge, supra note 8 (citing comments of Doug
Honig, a spokesman for the ACLU of Washington).
96. Drone Flights in the U.S., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/foia/faa-droneauthorizations (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
97. Id.
98. Crump, supra note 51, at 1608.
99. EPIC v. FAA: Challenging the FAA’s Failure to Establish Drone Privacy Rules, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/drones (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
100. Kate Mather, LAPD Becomes Nation’s Largest Police Department to Test Drones After Oversight
Panel Signs Off on Controversial Program, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017, 9:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-drones-20171017-story.html.
101. Id. Interestingly, the Seattle Police Department purchased two drones with federal funds, but after a
public hearing outlining how the Department would use drones drew vocal opposition from citizens with privacy
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grounded and they were ultimately destroyed.102 Three years later, the LAPD
invited public comment and held community meetings on the issue, using the
meetings to describe ways drones would benefit the department, such as in active
shooter or barricaded subject scenarios.103 Despite skepticism from citizens
during the public forums, overwhelmingly negative emails, and efforts by the
local ACLU to stop the program, police commissioners approved the plan.104
The Commission believed the LAPD’s new test plan placed sufficiently strict
limits on the department’s use of drones.105 Drones are to be used only in
specific, high-risk situations such as those involving barricaded suspects, active
shooter incidents, explosive devices or explosions, hostages, natural disasters,
hazardous materials incidents, search and rescue operations, and armed suspects
with superior firepower, an extraordinary tactical advantage, or who are wanted
in connection with firing at a police officer.106 All requests to deploy drones are
to be documented and reviewed, and the Police Commission is to receive
quarterly reports that will be made public.107 Video transmissions must be
recorded and retained, but the department may not weaponize drones or equip
them with facial recognition technology.108
One of the main concerns about law enforcement’s use of UAS is mission
creep,109 which is the idea that police will expand the use of the technology
beyond what was first allowed.110 Even where drones are initially proposed for
innocuous purposes like search and rescue and firefighting missions, law
enforcement is quick to contemplate more controversial ways to use them, such
as for deterring crime, writing traffic tickets,111 or observing crowds at political
rallies.112 An example of the potential for mission creep is presented by a town
where police officers state they intend to use drones “primarily” to patrol lengths
concerns, Mayor Mike McGuinn “pulled the plug” on the program. Clarridge, supra note 8. The Department
then gifted these drones to the LAPD. Id.
102. Mather, supra note 100.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 70, at 3.
107. Mather, supra note 100.
108. L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 70, at 3–4.
109. ACLU WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE OFFICE, WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOR A HEARING ON “THE FUTURE OF DRONES IN AMERICA: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVACY
CONSIDERATIONS”
6
(2013),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
aclu_statement_domestic_drones_senate_judiciary032013_final.pdf [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF DRONES IN
AMERICA].
110. Kate Mather, Should the LAPD Use Drones? Here’s What’s Behind the Heated Debate, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2017, 8:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-drones-20170808-story.html.
111. Id.
112. Brown, supra note 46 (documenting the use of drones to fly over a rally supporting Muslim
community); Fisher, supra note 45 (documenting the use of drones to monitor crowds at a rally for
Representative Scott Taylor); Fran Spielman, ACLU Sounds the Alarm About Bill Allowing Use of Drones to
Monitor Protesters, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 1, 2018, 5:17 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/aclusounds-the-alarm-about-bill-allowing-use-of-drones-to-monitor-protesters (discussing proposed legislation to
allow drones equipped with facial recognition technology to monitor public protests).
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of railroad tracks for trespassers starting in the spring of 2018.113 The
Department states it does not intend to install high-powered audio recording
devices or cameras due to cost and “guarantees” police will not fly over privately
owned property without a search warrant.114 A town councilor expressed
concerns about whether the Department’s policy adequately ensured the privacy
of residents whose properties are near the tracks or of people who happen to be
in the area.115 Although the intended purpose for the first two years is to educate
people about the dangers of trespassing near the railroad tracks, if officers
monitoring a drone’s video feed happen to “find another crime in progress,” they
are authorized to act upon it.116
Critics of the LAPD’s new drone program point to the ways the
Department’s use of other tactical equipment has expanded and warn that the
use of drone technology will similarly creep.117 According to the citizen group
Stop LAPD Spying, police helicopters were initially proposed for use in “limited
circumstances” such as for traffic control, but soon were routinely used for
tracking fleeing suspects or conducting aerial surveillance.118 SWAT teams were
first used only during riots, but now are regularly used to serve search warrants
and search for drugs.119 The LAPD acquired a StingRay cellphone tracker
through a DHS grant and promised to use it only to investigate terrorist activities,
but has since used it in drug investigations.120 When police have a powerful tool
in their arsenal to fight crime, the scope of the mission tends to expand.
Some police departments acknowledge the public’s privacy concerns and
fear that drone surveillance will create a “Big Brother” society, yet still fail to
curb that possibility. For example, the Wichita Police Department purchased a
drone and proposed a policy for drone use at a Citizen Review Board meeting,
seeking feedback from the public.121 The Department intends to use the drone
for accident reconstruction, crime scene documentation, SWAT responses, and
surveilling music festivals, but its nine-page proposed policy does not limit it to
any such uses.122 The proposed policy states in the first paragraph that its
“operational procedures are designed to minimize risk to people, property, and
aircraft during the operation of the sUAS while continuing to safeguard the right

113. Chase, supra note 73.
114. Id. (citing comments of Brunswick Patrol Commander Thomas Garrepy).
115. Id.
116. Elizabeth Clemente, Brunswick Police Promise Drones Won’t Leave the Tracks, FORECASTER (Jan. 17,
2018),
http://www.theforecaster.net/brunswick-police-promise-drones-wont-leave-the-tracks
(quoting
Brunswick Patrol Commander Thomas Garrepy).
117. See Fussell, supra note 48.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Mission Creep, supra note 90.
121. Jason Tidd, Wichita Police Are Buying a Drone, and They Want Public Input on Its Use, WICHITA
EAGLE (July 2, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.kansas.com/news/local/article214032819.html.
122. Id.
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to privacy of all persons.”123 There is no mention of privacy again in the policy
and it is silent on warrant requirements.124 At the meeting, board members raised
privacy concerns and asked for more information on drone capabilities, data
retention, prohibited uses, and whether drones would be used to target
individuals or properties.125 A department spokesman stated the policy will
likely “be rewritten with a greater emphasis on privacy.”126
The above examples illustrate a recurring theme in this issue: absent
federal, state, or local regulations outlining the permissible use of UAS by law
enforcement, the police are left to police themselves. When the public expresses
concern about how law enforcement will use UAS and questions whether
privacy interests are implicated, law enforcement officials ostensibly offer
transparency127 and guarantees that UAS will not be used for improper
purposes.128 For instance, New York State Police averred they will not use their
eighteen drones to bypass warrant requirements and that “privacy is a top
priority.”129 Across the nation, law enforcement agencies offer assurances they
will use drones legally and that current search and seizure laws already protect
the public’s civil liberties.130
D. CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE DRONE USE
At the federal level, UAS are regulated only by the FAA, although
Congress has attempted several times to pass laws that either address privacy
concerns at the federal level or delegate authority to regulate to the states,
thereby limiting the FAA’s authority.131 Numerous states have already enacted
drone legislation, despite the FAA’s assertion that it has exclusive authority to
regulate the national airspace system (NAS).132 Similarly, a small number of
local governments have passed ordinances attempting to address the issue.133
1.

Federal Regulation and Legislation

On the federal level, there has been limited regulation of drones. In 2012,
Congress charged both the FAA and the Secretary of Transportation to integrate
unmanned aircraft systems into the NAS through the National Defense
123. Wichita Police Dep’t, Policy No. 802: Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Team Guidelines, CITY
WICHITA
KAN.,
http://www.wichita.gov/WPD/PoliceDocuments/
Pol802.pdf#search=uas%20team%20guidelines (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (emphasis added).
124. See id.
125. Tidd, supra note 121.
126. Id. (citing comments of Wichita Police Department Captain Doug Nolte).
127. Woodall, supra note 62.
128. Chase, supra note 73 (citing comments of Brunswick Patrol Commander Thomas Garrepy).
129. State
Police
Unveil
New
Drone
Program,
NEWS12
WESTCHESTER,
http://westchester.news12.com/story/37330404/state-police-unveil-new-drone-program (last updated Feb. 12,
2018, 9:31 AM).
130. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 71.
131. See infra Subpart I.D.1.
132. MICHEL, supra note 11, at 4.
133. Id.
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012134 and the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA).135 Section 332 of the FMRA governs the
integration of drones into the NAS but omits any reference to privacy.136 Instead,
Congress’s intent in enacting both laws was to address issues of aviation safety
and to develop certification standards for both civil and public UAS.137
According to the FAA, it “does not regulate how UAS gather data on people or
property.”138 The FAA states that its mission is to provide a safe and efficient
aerospace system, and that “does not include regulating privacy.”139
The FAA oversees drone regulations and safety standards for all drones,
whether flown by hobbyists, commercial entities, or federal, state, or local
government offices.140 Generally, anyone can fly a drone under the Small UAS
Rule provided by 14 C.F.R. § 107, so long as they obtain a Remote Pilot
Certificate,141 register the UAS,142 and follow operational rules.143 These rules
include maintaining a line of sight with the UAS during flight, flying only during
daylight hours (or civil twilight) below 400 feet in altitude, and not over people
or vehicles.144 Law enforcement agencies have the choice of either flying under
134. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, § 1097, 125 Stat. 1298,
1608 (2011).
135. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–95, § 332, 126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012).
136. Id.
137. Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) requires the
FAA to establish a program which shall “safely designate nonexclusionary airspace” at “six test ranges” and
“develop certification standards and air traffic requirements for unmanned flight operations at test ranges” which
“address both civil and public unmanned aircraft systems.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 § 1097. Similar to the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), section 1097 of the NDAA
speaks only of safety concerns and is silent on the issue of privacy. Section 332 of the FMRA requires the FAA
to use its authority to recommend standards for operation, certification, and registration of UAS and standards
and licensing for UAS operators and pilots “to ensure the safe operation of civil unmanned aircraft systems and
public unmanned aircraft systems simultaneously in the national airspace system.” FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 § 332(a)(2)(b)(H).
138. Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515.
139. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42064, 42190 (June
28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, 183).
140. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
141. Certificates are available to pilots age sixteen and older who pass an exam at an FAA-approved testing
center and are valid for two years. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Becoming a Pilot, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/part_107/remote_pilot_cert (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
142. UAS weighing between 0.55 and 55 pounds must be registered with the FAA at a cost of five dollars.
See FAA DroneZone, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://faadronezone.faa.gov/# (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). The
FAA instituted the registration requirement in 2015 and a hobbyist brought a challenge in federal court arguing
that the FAA lacked statutory authority to promulgate rules or regulations regarding model aircraft under the
FMRA. Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The D.C. Circuit Court agreed, holding that
“the Registration Rule is unlawful to the extent that it applies to model aircraft.” Id. at 1093. This decision
exempted hobbyists from the registration rule for just a short time, as Congress passed the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–91, § 1092(d), 131 Stat. 1610, 1611 (2017), explicitly
reinstating the rule shortly after the court’s decision in Taylor.
143. See Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018).
144. Id. For the full list of operational limitations, see Summary of Small Unmanned Aircraft Rule (Part
107), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf.
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the more restrictive Small UAS Rule or obtaining a Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization (COA) to Part 107.145 According to the FAA, 122 police or
sheriff’s departments had received Part 107 waivers as of July 2018.146 The FAA
also offers a “blanket” exemption (Blanket COA) under section 333 of the
FMRA, which permits UAS operators to fly most anywhere in the country—
even outside their jurisdiction—except in restricted airspace, at an altitude of
400 feet or less during daylight hours, so long as pilots maintain a visual line of
sight.147 Many law enforcement agencies also opt for a jurisdictional COA,
which allows them to operate within their jurisdiction at higher altitudes and at
night, in addition to the Blanket COA.148
Because the FAA’s congressional mandate focuses on promoting safe
flight of civil aircraft and setting standards for safe operation,149 the Agency has
declined to address concerns raised by privacy groups such as EPIC.150 In 2012,
EPIC petitioned the FAA to “conduct a rulemaking to address the threat to
privacy and civil liberties that will result from the deployment of aerial drones
within the United States.”151 EPIC, joined by more than 100 organizations,
experts, and advocates, filed its petition due to concern about the threat drones
pose to both privacy and civil liberties.152 The FAA denied the petition in 2016
and issued a final rule on drones stating that privacy issues “are beyond the scope
of this rulemaking.”153 In response, EPIC filed a lawsuit in 2016 against the FAA
for its failure to establish drone privacy safeguards154 and another lawsuit in
2018 seeking injunctive relief to compel the FAA’s Drone Advisory Committee
to comply with its transparency obligations.155 EPIC’s 2016 suit was dismissed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in June of 2018
for lack of standing.156
145. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Beyond the Basics, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
146. Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Part 107 Waivers Granted, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/request_waiver/waivers_granted (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
147. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Petitioning for Exemption Under Section 333, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition (last visited Nov. 21,
2018);
see
also
So,
What’s
a
COA?,
SKYFIRE
CONSULTING
(Apr.
7,
2017),
https://www.skyfireconsulting.com/skyfire-drone-blog/certificate-of-authorization-guid-coa.
148. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Petitioning for Exemption Under Section 333, supra note 147; So,
What’s a COA?, supra note 147. In 2011, the Mesa County Sheriff’s Department received permission from the
FAA to operate its drones anywhere in the county, which spans 3,309 square miles. STANLEY & CRUMP, supra
note 36, at 7; About Us: Geography, MESA CTY., https://www.mesacounty.us/contact-us/about-us/geography/
(last visited Nov. 21, 2018). This is noteworthy because it is the first police department permitted to operate in
such a broad area. STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 36, at 7.
149. 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (2012).
150. EPIC v. FAA: Challenging the FAA’s Failure to Establish Drone Privacy Rules, supra note 99.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 892 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
155. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Drone Advisory Comm., No. 18–833 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 11, 2018).
156. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 892 F.3d at 1256. EPIC argued that increased testing of delivery and
reconnaissance drones would cause a loss of privacy and impair freedom of travel due to fears of constant
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Despite these efforts, there are currently no federal standards for individual
privacy protection from drones and their potential to effect “invasive and
pervasive surveillance.”157 Because the FAA’s scope is limited to safety
concerns and not privacy, some members of Congress have proposed legislation
focused on protecting the privacy interests of citizens from governmental
intrusion.158 Massachusetts Senator Edward Markey introduced the Drone
Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, which would provide strict
guidelines to minimize data collection and retention by drones and require law
enforcement to obtain warrants for surveillance absent “extreme exigent
circumstances.”159 The bill defines extreme “exigent circumstances” to mean
that law enforcement “reasonably believes there is an imminent danger of death
or serious physical injury” or a “high risk of an imminent terrorist attack by a
specific individual or organization,” which the Secretary of Homeland Security
identified as a credible threat.160 Senator Markey has previously introduced
earlier versions of this bill twice in the Senate and twice in the House of
Representatives.161 Some have criticized the proposed legislation as
underinclusive, because it does not address hobbyists, and fear that it will
preempt “areas of law typically left to the states, such as privacy, trespass, and
state and local police power.”162
Other U.S. senators believe that states are in the best position to protect the
public’s privacy from drone misuse.163 The Drone Federalism Act was
introduced in 2017 “as a way for local governments . . . to create drone rules

monitoring, id. at 1253, but the court found this chain of causation to potential injuries to be too attenuated, id.
at 1255.
157. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 631, 115th Cong. § 2(5) (2017).
158. See, e.g., Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 631, 115th Cong. (2017); Drone
Innovation Act of 2017, H.R. 2930, 115th Cong. (2017); Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015,
S. 635, 114th Cong. (2015); Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, S. 1016, 113th
Cong. (2013); Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972, 113th Cong. (2013);
Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, S. 1639, 113th Cong. (2013); Preserving Freedom from
Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, H.R. 5925, 112th Cong. (2012); Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted
Surveillance Act of 2012, S. 3287, 112th Cong. (2012); Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2012,
H.R. 6676, 112th Cong. (2012).
159. Press Release, Senator for Mass. Ed Markey, Senator Markey & Rep. Welch Introduce Legislation to
Ensure Transparency, Privacy for Drone Use (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/-senator-markey-and-rep-welch-introduce-legislation-to-ensure-transparency-privacy-for-drone-use.
160. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 631 § 340(b)(2).
161. See S. 631: Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s631 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (providing an overview of the
bill’s history); sources cited supra note 158; see also Keith Lang, Sen. Markey Files Bill to Protect Privacy in
Commercial Drone Use, HILL (Nov. 4, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/189208-senmarkey-files-bill-to-protect-privacy-in-commercial (describing how Senator Markey’s proposed legislation
would require the FAA to consider privacy interests in its regulation of drones).
162. Scott Hall, The Drone Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017: Overdue or Over-Reaching?, JDSUPRA
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-drone-privacy-and-transparency-act-42426.
163. See Jonathan Vanian, New Senate Drone Bill Would Give Power to States and Local Governments,
FORTUNE (May 25, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/05/25/senate-drone-bill-faa-regulations.
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specific to their regions without butting heads with the federal government.”164
The text of the bill limits the FAA’s authority “to the extent necessary to ensure
the safety and efficiency of the national airspace system for interstate
commerce” and reserves state and local governments the right to regulate and
protect public safety, personal privacy, property rights, and other interests.165
According to the bill’s sponsor, California Senator Diane Feinstein, “State,
local, and tribal governments have a legitimate interest in protecting public
safety and privacy from the misuse of drones.”166 The Drone Federalism Act
would cede authority to regulate from the earth to 200 feet above its surface to
state and local government.167 If the bill does pass, it would leave the space
between 200 and 400 feet above ground unregulated locally and subject only to
FAA regulations.168 However, the bill would place no specific limits on the use
of UAS by law enforcement; it would merely allow local government to regulate
the swath of airspace closest to the earth.169
2.

State Legislation

In response to pressure from privacy advocates and the public, many states
have passed legislation regulating the use of drones by law enforcement.170 In
the past five years, all fifty states have proposed drone legislation of some
kind.171 More than half of states have actually passed laws regulating drones and
addressing privacy concerns posed by both law enforcement and nongovernmental actors, such as commercial entities or private citizens.172 Fifteen

164. Id.
165. Drone Federalism Act of 2017, S. 1272, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
166. Vanian, supra note 163.
167. Id.
168. Georeen Tanner, Drones Becoming a Threat to First-Responder Operations, FOX NEWS,
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/drones-becoming-a-threat-to-first-responder-operations (last visited Nov. 21,
2018).
169. See id. (“[The] bill . . . would give local governments the power to regulate drones flying below 200
feet.”).
170. Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for Legislatures, BROOKINGS INST.
2 (Nov. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/drones-and-aerial-surveillance-considerations-forlegislatures. Eight states passed laws regulating drones in 2013 and five states passed such laws in 2014, “with
eleven of those thirteen states requiring a warrant before the government may use a drone.” Id.
171. MICHEL, supra note 11, at 4–5. As of March 2017, only South Dakota had not considered any type of
drone legislation. Id. However, effective July 1, 2017, South Dakota amended its definition of “trespassing to
eavesdrop,” making it a crime for private actors to use a drone to conduct unlawful surveillance. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-21-1 (2018). The law does not apply to law enforcement while engaged in their lawful duties. Id.
172. Twenty-six states have adopted some type of legislation as of January 17, 2018: Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia and Wisconsin. See 2017 UAS State Legislation Update, supra note 10. Nineteen states have passed
laws protecting against privacy invasions from non-government operators, with several criminalizing the use of
drones to commit the offense of voyeurism. Id.
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states have enacted laws preempting localities from regulating drones in some
way.173
The FAA has pushed against these efforts, viewing all attempts to regulate
airspace use as infringing on its exclusive domain to regulate aircraft because
federal law has preempted the field.174 The FAA cites safety concerns and
fractionalized control of the airspace when state or local governments attempt to
regulate UAS, or any aircraft.175 “A navigable airspace free from inconsistent
state and local restrictions is essential to the maintenance of a safe and sound air
transportation system.”176
State measures regulating drone use by law enforcement have been
criticized by some as misguided because they focus on the technology of drones,
rather than the “threat of pervasive surveillance.”177 According to Gregory
McNeal of the Brookings Institution, “the legislation is rarely tailored in such a
way to prevent the harm that advocates fear.”178 Focusing on drone technology,
rather than the threat of a surveillance society, creates an unintended result
because it forecloses the use of drones for beneficial tasks such as accident and
crime scene documentation, while still allowing pervasive surveillance from
manned aircraft or by other means.179
a.

State Laws Regulating Drone Use by Law Enforcement

Eighteen states have enacted laws requiring law enforcement to obtain
search warrants prior to using drones to conduct a search or surveillance.180
Some of these laws merely reaffirm the Fourth Amendment’s baseline guarantee
of a person’s right to be free from warrantless searches, while other states

173. Id. The following states preempt local government from regulating drones in some way: Arizona,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah and Virginia. Id. It is noteworthy that nine of the states preempting local regulation
of drones have themselves either failed or chosen not to institute warrant requirements. Id. One such state,
Colorado, did pass H.B. 1070 in 2017, authorized a study to “identify ways to integrate UAS within local and
state government functions relating to firefighting, search and rescue, accident reconstruction, crime scene
documentation, emergency management, and emergencies involving significant property loss, injury or death.”
Id.
174. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF
UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS
(UAS)
FACT
SHEET
2
(2015),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf (“To ensure the
maintenance of a safe and sound air transportation system and of navigable airspace free from inconsistent
restrictions, FAA has regulatory authority over matters pertaining to aviation safety.”).
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007)).
177. McNeal, supra note 170, at 2.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin currently require law enforcement
to obtain search warrants prior to using UAS for search or surveillance. See 2017 UAS State Legislation Update,
supra note 10.
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provide more robust protection that far exceeds the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement.181
For example, Oregon’s law preventing warrantless drone surveillance is
the most protective state measure in the United States, making clear that
information gathered in violation of the law cannot be used by law
enforcement.182 The law, which was enacted in 2013, prohibits law
enforcement’s use of drones except when: (1) a warrant is issued authorizing the
use of UAS that specifies the period of operation and not to exceed thirty days
which is renewable by the court upon motion and showing of good cause;
(2) the agency has probable cause to believe there has been or will be a crime
and exigent circumstances exist making it unreasonable to obtain a warrant
authorizing drone use; (3) an individual gives written consent; (4) conducting
search and rescue activities; (5) assisting an individual during an emergency if
the agency believes there is an imminent threat to life or safety of the individual;
(6) preserving public safety, private property, or assessing environmental or
weather-related damage during a state emergency that is declared by the
governor; (7) performing crime scene reconstruction; or (8) conducting training
exercises.183 Any data that is obtained in violation of the statute (including
during training exercises), is not admissible in any court proceeding and cannot
be used to establish probable cause.184 The ACLU advocated for the bill’s
passage185 and after it was passed, EPIC praised it as an exemplar designed to
“prevent mass and/or suspicionless surveillance.”186
At the opposite end of the spectrum are state measures that afford no further
protection than the Fourth Amendment does. For example, Wisconsin prohibits
the use of a drone to gather evidence from a place where an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, without first obtaining a search warrant.187
Excepted from the warrant requirement are: (1) drones used in public places;
(2) search and rescue operations; (3) searching for an escaped prisoner;
(4) surveillance conducted prior to serving an arrest warrant; or (5) if a law
enforcement officer believes use of a drone is necessary to prevent imminent
danger or to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.188 This law is similar
to the Fourth Amendment, which already requires a warrant where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy, as discussed in Part II. Therefore,
Wisconsin’s law, as well as those of a handful of other states, “place[s] no

181. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 837.310–837.345 (2017).
182. State Drone Law and UAV Policy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/statepolicy/drones (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
183. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 837.310–837.345.
184. Id.
185. Privacy: Regulate Use of Drones in Oregon (HB 2710, SB 71) (2013), ACLU, https://acluor.org/en/legislation/privacy-regulate-use-drones-oregon-hb-2710-sb-71-2013 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
186. State Drone Law and UAV Policy, supra note 182.
187. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55(2) (West 2018).
188. Id.
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meaningful restrictions on government use of drones.”189 And unlike Oregon’s
law, Wisconsin’s does not explicitly preclude evidence obtained in violation of
the statute from being admitted in court or to establish probable cause, nor does
it require that any warrant obtained specify that a drone may be used.190
Most states with laws restricting law enforcement use of drones fall
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, in that the exceptions to the warrant
requirement are more explicit, rather than a “broadly-worded exception.”191 For
instance, Florida prohibits drone searches and seizures by law enforcement
except in limited circumstances, including (1) when there is a high risk of
terrorist attack; (2) the agency obtains a search warrant from a judge authorizing
the use of a drone; (3) when law enforcement officers believe there is an
imminent danger to life or serious property damage; or (4) to forestall the escape
of a suspect or destruction of evidence.192 Evidence obtained in violation of the
statute is inadmissible in any criminal prosecution.193

b.

Failed State Attempts to Regulate Law Enforcement Use of
Drones

Thirty-two states have tried and failed to enact laws requiring law
enforcement to obtain a warrant absent exigent circumstances.194 California
Governor Edmund Gerald “Jerry” Brown vetoed such a bill in 2014,195 which
also would have required that most data, photos, or videos collected by drones
be destroyed within one year.196 In a letter to the California State Assembly
explaining why he vetoed the bill, Governor Brown stated the exceptions to the
warrant requirement were too narrow and went beyond those required by both
the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution.197 Although the bill had
bipartisan support, it was opposed by law enforcement groups, including the
California Police Chiefs Association, the California State Sheriffs’

189. Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need for State Legislation, 52
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 436 (2015). Iowa, Montana, and Utah similarly use language that is very broad and
affords no greater protection than the Fourth Amendment does. Id.
190. Compare OR. REV. STAT. §§ 837.310–837.345 (2017), with WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55.
191. Smith, supra note 189, at 429.
192. FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2018).
193. Id. § 934.50(6).
194. See 2017 UAS State Legislation Update, supra note 10.
195. Lily Hay Newman, California Governor Vetoes Bill Requiring Warrant for Police Surveillance
Drones,
SLATE
(Sept.
30,
2014,
5:47
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/
2014/09/30/california_governor_jerry_brown_vetoes_drone_surveillance_law_enforcement.html.
196. Aaron Mendelson, California Senate Approves Measure Banning Warrantless Drone Surveillance,
REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2014, 10:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-california-drones/californiasenate-approves-measure-banning-warrantless-drone-surveillance-idUSKBN0GR0E020140827.
197. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 28,
2014) (on file with author).
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Association,198 and the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office.199 More
recently, lobbyists employed by drone manufacturers successfully blocked a
similar bill in 2016.200 Thus, special interest groups have defeated the California
legislature’s efforts to regulate the use of drone technology.
An Ohio bill requiring law enforcement to obtain warrants prior to using
drones for evidence gathering met a similar fate,201 even though it had bipartisan support. The bill was sponsored by a Democrat and a Republican
senator and both expressed concerns about protecting the constitutional rights of
Ohioans and preserving civil liberties.202 One of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Kris
Jordan, warned that “[t]here aren’t enough guardrails . . . to limits [sic] . . . the
potential for spying. . . . we need to put guardrails out there to protect the
individual rights of citizens.”203 After the first bill stalled in the state senate,204
the two lawmakers introduced a similar bill in 2017.205 Police have been using
drones in Ohio since at least 2014, yet there are still no laws regulating drone
use by law enforcement.206
3.

Local Ordinances Regulating Law Enforcement Use of Drones

Where states have failed to act to regulate law enforcement use of drones,
some local governments are passing measures to guard the public’s privacy and

198. Mendelson, supra note 196.
199. Conor Freidersdorf, Why Police Don’t Need Warrants to Snoop with Drones, ATLANTIC (Aug. 28,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/california-lawmakers-back-a-restraining-orderon-police-drones/379267.
200. Jazmine Ulloa, Why California May Not See Statewide Rules on the Use of Drones Anytime Soon, L.A.
TIMES (July 31, 2016, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-drone-bills-california-20160731snap-story.html. Assemblyman Bill Quirk’s bill would have prohibited drone surveillance of private property
without a warrant in most situations and required police to adopt policies prior to employing drones. Mike
Maharrey, California Bill Taking on Warrantless Drone Surveillance Passes Assembly 61-12, TENTH AMEND.
CTR. (May 28, 2015), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2015/05/california-bill-taking-on-warrantlessdrone-surveillance-passes-assembly-61-12. The bill passed the Assembly with a vote of 61 to 12, but languished
in the state senate until it was withdrawn. See Assemb. B. 56, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
201. See S.B. 251, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session (Ohio 2015). The bill was introduced on December 8,
2015, reached 25% progression, and died in committee. Ohio Senate Bill 251, LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/OH/bill/SB251/2015 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
202. Bill Would Restrict Police Use of Drones, OHIO PUB. RADIO (Mar. 24, 2017), http://wcbe.org/post/billwould-restrict-police-use-drones.
203. Id.
204. Ohio S.B. 251.
205. See S.B. 60, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); Richard Wilson, Eyes in the Sky: Law
Enforcement Drone-Use Sparks Privacy Concerns, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Oct. 21, 2017),
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/eyes-the-sky-law-enforcement-drone-use-sparks-privacyconcerns/KnO52eZi9NijumCI6hXvAJ (“State Sen. Michael Skindell (D-Cleveland) and State Sen. Kris Jordan
(R-Delaware) are co-sponsors of Senate Bill 60 . . . .”).
206. Id. Chief Deputy Mike Eberle, stated that the Auglaize County Sheriff’s Office uses drones “primarily
in cases of missing persons and serious traffic crash investigations.” Id. However, if during such a flight the
drone captured photographic evidence of another crime, police could likely use that evidence as probable cause
to obtain a warrant. Id. (“It’s no different than if you’re in somebody’s house and you notice a marijuana plant.
If you think there’s more, you’ve got to go get a warrant . . . but you stumbled upon it legally.”).
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civil liberties.207 However, the majority of local measures target private drone
use—127 of the 133 ordinances passed as of 2017 restrict private actors only.208
At least six local municipalities have passed ordinances restricting law
enforcement or government use of drones.209 These have taken a variety of
approaches, from prohibiting all drone use by law enforcement210 to adopting
“future-proof” policies, which require approval by local government prior to law
enforcement’s use of any new surveillance technology,211 to protection no
broader than the Fourth Amendment affords.212
The Syracuse City Council passed a resolution in 2013 prohibiting law
enforcement or other city agencies from using drones until the federal and state
governments adopt legislation “that adequately protects the privacy of the
population.”213 The resolution specifically points to the need for research
regarding privacy considerations, the fact that the FAA is not tasked with
addressing privacy or civil liberties, and the lack of safeguards preventing drones
from being used to infringe upon fundamental privacy rights and obtain large
amounts of data without a warrant.214
Seattle is now one of a handful of localities that prohibits law enforcement
use of drones.215 The Seattle Police Department originally acquired two drones
using federal funds, which it intended to use to locate missing persons and
investigate crimes.216 However, when local residents became aware of the plan,
they vocally opposed it at a public hearing outlining proposed restrictions for the
Department’s use.217 In response, the city’s mayor ended the program before it
even started, saying police need to stay focused on “community building.”218
Seattle then passed an ordinance addressing not drones specifically, but the

207. See MICHEL, supra note 11, at 1, 2.
208. MICHEL, supra note 11, at 2.
209. Id. (listing Syracuse, New York; Pierce County, Washington; Seattle, Washington; and Spokane,
Washington as having ordinances specifically restricting law enforcement).
210. Tim Knauss, Syracuse Bans Police Drones Until Privacy Regulations in Place, SYRACUSE.COM (Dec.
16, 2013), http://s.syracuse.com/I4663FB.
211. See, e.g., Eric Kurhi, Pioneering Spy-Tech Law Adopted by Santa Clara County, MERCURY NEWS,
https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/07/pioneering-spy-tech-law-adopted-by-santa-clara-county
(last
updated Sept. 22, 2016, 12:23 AM); Seattle Adopts Nation’s Strongest Regulations for Surveillance Technology,
ACLU OF WASH. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/seattle-adopts-nation’s-strongest-regulationssurveillance-technology.
212. See PIERCE COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 1.30.010–.040 (2018) (“No County department or agency shall
use a drone or other unmanned aircraft . . . except as authorized by state and federal law.”).
213. Knauss, supra note 210.
214. Resolution to Syracuse Common Council to Prevent the Unregulated Use of Drones in Syracuse,
SYRACUSE PEACE COUNCIL, http://peacecouncil.net/resolution-to-syracuse-common-council-to-prevent-theunregulated-use-of-drones-in-syracuse (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
215. Laura L. Myers, Seattle Mayor Grounds Police Drone Program, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2013, 10:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drones-seattle/seattle-mayor-grounds-police-drone-programidUSBRE91704H20130208.
216. Id.
217. Clarridge, supra note 8.
218. Id.
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acquisition of all surveillance technology by the city.219 The measure allows the
public an opportunity to express its concerns before the acquisition of any
surveillance technology, including equipment, hardware, or software.220 At the
time it was passed, the ACLU praised the ordinance as “the strongest measure
adopted by an American city to regulate the acquisition of surveillance
technology.”221 Given the vocal opposition to the proposal to allow police use
of drones in 2013, the city is unlikely to change its position in the near future,
since any new technology would require community meetings prior to city
council approval.222 In fact, Seattle prohibits drone use anywhere within the city
unless the drone activity is for commercial filming with a permit.223
The City of Spokane passed a similar ordinance in 2013, requiring city
council approval for the acquisition of any new surveillance equipment, such as
drones or camera networks.224 However, Spokane’s ordinance went a step
further and also requires approval before using third-party surveillance
equipment.225 Thus, city departments cannot circumvent the law’s intent by
“outsourcing” surveillance to third parties.226 According to the ACLU, this is a
critical provision making Spokane’s ordinance even more protective than
Seattle’s.227
In California, Santa Clara County has similarly adopted a “future-proof”
model for electronic surveillance, requiring police agencies to establish policies
prior to acquiring emerging surveillance technologies.228 The ordinance was in
response to various local agencies’ acquisitions of a drone and Stingray
cellphone tracker229 and plans to build a “Domain Awareness Center”
information hub.230 Santa Clara County’s ordinance does not target particular
219. Seattle Adopts Nation’s Strongest Regulations for Surveillance Technology, supra note 211.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. SEATTLE SPECIAL EVENTS OFFICE, SPECIAL EVENTS PERMITTING HANDBOOK: DRONES,
https://www.seattle.gov/special-events-office/handbook/drones (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
224. Jamela Debelak, Surveillance: Spokane Acts to Protect Privacy and Provide Transparency, ACLU OF
WASH. (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.aclu-wa.org/blog/surveillance-spokane-acts-protect-privacy-and-providetransparency.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Kurhi, supra note 211.
229. A StingRay is a surveillance device that impersonates a cellular network bas station and tricks all
nearby phones and other mobile devices into identifying themselves by revealing their unique serial numbers.
State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 340–41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). As each device identifies itself, the
StingRay can determine the location from which the signal came. Id. at 341. The device can be handheld,
installed on a vehicle, or mounted on a drone. Id.
230. Kurhi, supra note 211. The City of Oakland planned to build a Domain Awareness Center that would
have linked the 700 plus cameras throughout Oakland’s public schools and public housing. The plan was
successfully opposed by area residents and the ACLU. Brian Hofer, How the Fight to Stop Oakland’s Domain
Awareness Center Laid the Groundwork for the Oakland Privacy Commission, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Sept. 21,
2018),
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/how-fight-stop-oaklands-domain-awareness-center-laid-groundworkoakland-privacy-commission. Privacy advocates warn that centers which “collect so much information about
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technologies, but places the burden on public agencies to notify the Board of
Supervisors and the public “in advance about all potentially invasive
innovations.”231
Pierce County in Washington adopted an ordinance entitled “Freedom
from Unwarranted Surveillance” in 2013.232 It prohibits any county agency from
using a drone to gather evidence, “except as authorized by state and federal
law.”233 The ordinance also includes an exception for exigent circumstances but
does not define the term.234 Washington is not among the eighteen states that
require a warrant.235 Thus, the county’s measure affords no greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND HIGH-TECH
SURVEILLANCE DOCTRINES AND HOW COURTS ARE APPLYING THEM
Current Fourth Amendment doctrine is ill-equipped to address the
technological developments that lead to widespread surveillance, which is the
precise challenge that drones present. The Supreme Court has articulated two
primary tests to determine whether a search has occurred for Fourth Amendment
purposes: the trespassory test and the reasonable expectation of privacy test.236
Because drones can surveil without ever trespassing on an individual’s property
and capture large amounts of information that is exposed to public view, even
long-term surveillance might not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.237
Under the Court’s aerial surveillance doctrine, brief overhead searches
from manned aircraft do not violate the Fourth Amendment,238 but it is unclear
whether the same reasoning would apply to drones conducting surveillance and
continuously monitoring individuals or their property. Similarly, the Court has
held that when the government uses sense-enhancing technology not in general
use to conduct surveillance that would have previously only been possible by

people from various sources” can be used to create a picture of a person’s daily activities, whether or not they
are suspected of any wrongdoing, and “have the potential to become the nerve center of the “total surveillance
society.” LOVE, supra note 49, at 16.
231. Kurhi, supra note 211.
232. PIERCE COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 1.30.010–.040 (2018).
233. Id. § 1.30.020 (emphasis added).
234. Id. § 1.30.030.
235. See 2017 UAS State Legislation Update, supra note 10.
236. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108, 116–17 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that surveillance of the
front of a home conducted by a pole-top camera for eight months did not constitute a search because there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy).
238. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
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physical intrusion, the Fourth Amendment is implicated.239 However, drones
present a technology that is both widely used by the general public240 and
equipped with cameras and other tools that enhance the senses beyond what any
human could perceive.241 Despite a recent Supreme Court decision recognizing
a right to privacy in the whole of an individual’s movements,242 it is unlikely the
current aerial and high-tech surveillance doctrines protect individuals from the
invasive and pervasive nature of drone surveillance and the unprecedented level
of intrusion it presents.
A. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As discussed in Part I, many states and local governments rely on the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as
the sole limitation on law enforcement’s use of UAS. Alternately, enacted
measures—such as Wisconsin’s statute or Pierce County’s ordinance—parallel
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, without adding to it.243 However, it is
uncertain whether the Fourth Amendment provides any protection with respect
to UAS surveillance, as the Supreme Court has not decided an aerial surveillance
case in almost three decades, pre-dating the advent of UAS.244 Under either the
trespassory test or the reasonable expectation of privacy test, law enforcement
may likely use a drone to conduct ongoing surveillance of a person or property
that is invisible from the air,245 provided it does not actually trespass246 or create
a physical disturbance.247
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”248 For almost two-hundred years,249 the Court interpreted the Fourth
Amendment literally to mean that a search occurred only when the government
searched tangible things: the person, house, papers, or effects, and refused to
239. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
240. Atherton, supra note 1 (reporting 1,500,000 drone hobbyists in the United States as of March 2016).
241. See supra Subpart I.B.
242. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018).
243. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55(2) (2018); PIERCE COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 1.30.010–.040 (2018).
244. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
245. AMY ALBANO & LISA S. KURIHARA, INVASION OF THE DRONES 20 (2016),
https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Member-Engagement/Professional-Departments/CityAttorneys/Library/2016/Spring-2016/5-2016-Spring-Drones-Flying-By-Your-City-Amy-Alban. The length of
time the Supreme Court would find permissible is undefined, but it is “for some period of time that is less than
four weeks,” as the Court stated in Jones. Id.
246. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that a search occurs when the government
physically occupies private property for the purpose of obtaining information).
247. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1172 (N.M. 2015) (holding that an aerial search from a
helicopter constituted a search because the prolonged hovering created a physical disturbance and transformed
the “surveillance from a lawful observation of an area left open to public view to an unconstitutional intrusion
into [the defendant’s] expectation of privacy”).
248. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
249. This accounts for the span between Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) and Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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extend Fourth Amendment protections “to forbid hearing or sight,” such as
conversations recorded by wiretap.250 However, the Court now characterizes that
interpretation as only a baseline protection, stating “[w]hen ‘the Government
obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or
effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has
‘undoubtedly occurred.’”251 This physical intrusion on the property rights of an
individual is known as the trespassory test.252
In 1967, the Court expanded its view of the Fourth Amendment radically
in Katz v. United States, holding that a search could occur in the absence of a
physical intrusion by the government and that the trespass doctrine was no
longer controlling.253 “For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”254 Katz also articulated the plain-view doctrine, which states that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”255 Conversely, even
in an area exposed to the public, what a person seeks to preserve as private may
be constitutionally protected if that person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable
under the circumstances.256 Applying Katz, the Fourth Amendment affords
protection from invasion by the government when a person claims a justifiable,
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy.257
In the wake of Katz,258 it was unclear whether the reasonable expectation
of privacy test had fully supplanted the trespassory test.259 Later cases applied
the two-prong reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated by Justice
Harlan in his concurrence to Katz.260 First, a person must have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.261 Second, society must be prepared
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.262

250. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–65 (1928). The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
is not violated “unless there has been an official search and seizure of [a defendant’s] person, or such a seizure
of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the
purpose of making a seizure.” Id. at 466.
251. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 n.3
(2012)).
252. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
tied to common-law trespass.”).
253. 389 U.S. at 353.
254. Id. at 351.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 351; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
257. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
258. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“We have since decoupled violation of a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property . . . .”).
259. Some argued the Katz decision was a “watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence,” while others
viewed it not as a move away from the Olmstead framework, but merely as reemphasizing a “loose propertybased view.” Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 820 (2004) (footnote omitted).
260. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
261. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
262. Id.

K - BENTLEY_20 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2018]

1/19/2019 11:31 AM

POLICING THE POLICE

277

Forty-five years later, the Court clarified in United States v. Jones that “the
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted
for, the common-law trespassory test.”263 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
held that by placing an electronic tracking device on a vehicle for a period of
twenty-eight days, the government had trespassed and it constituted a search.264
In Jones, the government argued that the vehicle’s driver had no reasonable
expectation of privacy because the vehicle traveled on public roads and was
visible to all.265 The majority reached its decision by returning to the trespassory
test,266 stating that Katz did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope or change
the principle that when the government physically intrudes into a
constitutionally protected area, the Fourth Amendment is implicated.267
According to Justice Scalia, relying on the trespassory test, rather than the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, avoids the “thorny problem” presented
by Katz’s open-ended inquiry and leaves for a future case the question of how
much surveillance is reasonable.268
The Court’s decision in Jones left unanswered the question of when
ongoing surveillance becomes a search.269 It also did not address surveillance
that occurs without a physical intrusion.270 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Jones notes that because physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms
of surveillance, the majority’s physical trespass test provides little guidance in
cases presenting novel methods of surveillance.271 According to the majority,
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”272 Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence also raised the question of informational privacy, warning that the
“government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects
of identity is susceptible to abuse.”273 After the Court’s decision in Jones, there
are two tests for determining if a search has occurred for Fourth Amendment
purposes: the trespassory test and the reasonable expectation of privacy test.274
263. 565 U.S. at 409.
264. Id. at 403–04.
265. Id. at 406.
266. Id. at 404.
267. Id. at 407–08.
268. Id. at 412–13.
269. KURIHARA & ALBANO, supra note 245, at 21.
270. Jones, 565 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the majority’s decision still
provided no protection from long-term government monitoring that could be accomplished “without committing
a technical trespass”).
271. Id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 411 (alteration in original).
273. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor went on to state,
[W]hen considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s
public movements[,] I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will,
their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.
Id.
274. See id. at 409.
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B. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND HIGH-TECH SURVEILLANCE DOCTRINES
The Supreme Court applied the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test
to three key cases in the 1980s, which form the basis for its current aerial
surveillance doctrine: California v. Ciraolo,275 Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,276 and Florida v. Riley.277 Additionally, the Court examined the
government’s use of sense-enhancing technology in Kyllo v. United States278 and
its ability to surveil retroactively in Carpenter v. United States.279 Because law
enforcement can use UAS both to conduct aerial surveillance and as a platform
for sense-enhancing technology, this Note will examine each case in turn. In
general, the Court has remained consistent to its understanding that “mere visual
observation does not constitute a search.”280
In California v. Ciraolo, the Court held that police flying in a fixed-wing
aircraft 1,000 feet above an individual’s home and yard deliberately looking for
marijuana plants did not constitute a search.281 At common law, the small area
immediately adjacent to a home is its curtilage and enjoys a heightened
expectation of privacy.282 However, the Court opined that the fact that an area is
within curtilage was not a bar to all police observation.283 The Court applied the
Katz framework and held that the expectation of privacy was not reasonable,
even though the yard had high double fences, because any member of the public
flying overhead could have observed exactly what the officers did.284 “The
Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require
law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public
thoroughfares.”285
In a companion case to Ciraolo, the Court held that aerial photography of
Dow Chemical’s plant complex conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency was not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.286 Dow argued that
its 2,000-acre plant complex was industrial curtilage287 entitled to heightened
constitutional protection, similar to the curtilage of a private home.288 Applying
the Katz test, the Court concluded Dow had a “reasonable, legitimate, and

275. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
276. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
277. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
278. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
279. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
280. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
281. 476 U.S. 207, 209–10 (1986).
282. Id. at 212–13.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 213.
286. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
287. Curtilage is contrasted with open fields: “[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from governmental interference or surveillance.”
Id. at 235 (alteration in original) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)). The Dow Chemical
Court noted that Dow’s industrial complex fell somewhere between curtilage and open fields. Id. at 236.
288. Id. at 235.
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objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings,” but
not to the open areas of the plant complex.289 The Court opined that “surveillance
of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not
generally available to the public” might require a warrant, but that the
photographs at issue were “not so revealing of intimate details as to raise
constitutional concerns.”290 The dissent warned that determining “the existence
of an asserted privacy interest . . . solely by reference to the manner of
surveillance used to intrude on that interest” would erode Fourth Amendment
rights as technology advanced.291
Three years later in Florida v. Riley, the Court held that flying a helicopter
just 400 feet above a partially-covered greenhouse was not a search, reaffirming
its decision in Ciraolo.292 Although the property searched was within the
curtilage of the home, because the roof and sides of the greenhouse were left
partially open, the Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation
of privacy since private and commercial flight by helicopter were not “unheard
of” in the area.293 Because it was navigable airspace and any member of the
public could legally have flown over the property in a helicopter at an altitude
of 400 feet and observed the defendant’s greenhouse, the police officer also
legally could.294 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor reasoned that the inquiry
should not be whether the helicopter could conceivably observe the curtilage
without violating FAA regulations, but whether the aircraft was “in the public
airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient
regularity” that defendant’s expectation of privacy was not objectively
reasonable.295
While Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, and Riley all involved either naked-eye
observation or camera, the Court examined the government’s use of senseenhancing technology in Kyllo, twelve years later.296 The case considered the
legality of the government’s use of a thermal imager, which detects infrared
radiation and operates like a video camera, to show heat images inside a home.297
The scan was performed from the officer’s parked vehicle across the street and
showed that parts of the defendant’s home were hot compared to the rest of the
three-unit dwelling, leading to an inference that halide lights were being used to

289. Id. at 236, 239.
290. Id. at 238.
291. Id. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
292. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
293. Id. at 450.
294. Id. at 450–51.
295. Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor went on to say that the
defendant has the burden of proving his expectation is reasonable and because Riley had introduced no evidence
to the contrary, his expectation was not reasonable. Id. This seems to leave open the question of whether an
individual can offer evidence to show that aircraft are not flown over his home with sufficient regularity to render
his expectation of privacy reasonable.
296. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
297. Id.
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grow marijuana inside.298 The thermal scans, along with other evidence, formed
the basis to obtain a search warrant of the home, where police found more than
one hundred marijuana plants.299 Here, the Court held that the government’s use
of a “device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion” constituted
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes “and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant.”300
In 2018, the Court held in Carpenter that a person has a “reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”301 There, the
government obtained by court order the defendant’s historical cell-site records
from wireless carriers for 127 days, providing the government with 12,898
location points cataloging his daily movements.302 The Court noted the unique
privacy concerns posed by the government’s ability to access information and
“travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts.”303 Applying Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Court reasoned that the government’s
access to cell-site records infringes on that expectation, giving the government
an “intimate window into . . . [a person’s] ‘familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations,’” thus revealing “‘the privacies of life.’”304
Because the government invaded the defendant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in his physical movements, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment
search occurred305 and the government must obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause before acquiring cell-site location information.306
In Carpenter, the Court provided two guideposts for determining which
expectations of privacy are protected, based on historical understanding of the
Fourth Amendment at the time of its adoption.307 First, the Fourth Amendment
secures the “‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”308 Second, the Framers
intended to place obstacles in the way of “too permeating police surveillance.”309
The Court kept these guideposts in mind when applying the Fourth Amendment
in Carpenter and will likely continue to do so when considering future
innovations in surveillance.310
C. LOWER COURT DECISIONS SINCE CIRAOLO, DOW CHEMICAL, RILEY, AND
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 40.
301. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
302. Id. at 2212.
303. Id. at 2218.
304. Id. at 2217 (first quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012); then quoting Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014)).
305. Id. at 2219–20.
306. Id. at 2221.
307. Id. at 2214.
308. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
309. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
310. See id.
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KYLLO
The Court has not decided a case involving the government’s use of aerial
surveillance in almost thirty years.311 Thus, the current aerial surveillance
doctrine is largely based on outdated assumptions regarding manned aircraft,
only some of which apply to unmanned aircraft.312 Similarly, there have been no
decisions regarding sense-enhancing technology since 2001.313 As technology
continues to advance and methods of surveillance become more sophisticated,
lower courts must decide warrantless surveillance cases in light of either the
trespassory test used in Jones, or the reasonable expectation of privacy test the
Court applied in Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, and Riley.314 An interpretation of these
cases by one city attorney’s office to the League of California Cities summarizes
the current constitutional framework:
Based on these cases one can glean that police may engage in the following
activities without a warrant: fly a drone within legally permissible airspace to
conduct visual surveillance of outdoor property (Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, Riley);
use sense-enhancing technology to observe certain exterior details of property, as
long as technology is in general public use (Dow Chemical, Kyllo); and conduct
short-term ongoing surveillance (some period less than 4 weeks) (Jones
concurrence). However, from a private citizen’s perspective, such usage may be
unsettling.315

Thus, under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, there is likely little
protection from warrantless drone surveillance.316 Under the trespassory test, the
small, lightweight drones popular with law enforcement are unlikely to cause a
physical intrusion.317 Under the Katz test, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in what a person exposes to public view,318 even if an officer must be

311. The last aerial surveillance case the Court decided was Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
312. Schoen & Tooshi, supra note 3, at 4.
313. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *23 (D. Mass.
Sept. 1, 2015) (“[I]n the face of advancing technology, ‘what a person knowingly exposes to the public,’
engenders profoundly different ramifications than it did in 1967, when Katz was decided.” (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))).
315. ALBANO & KURIHARA, supra note 245, at 21.
316. According to a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, which cited Kyllo, drones
outfitted with especially powerful cameras and thermal imagers that can see through walls would probably
constitute a search because they are not generally available to the public. THOMPSON II, supra note 58, at 13.
However, the use of lower-powered cameras and less sophisticated technology to view people and objects visible
from public airways are likely not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
317. See State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1171 (N.M. 2015) (“[W]hen low-flying aerial activity leads to more
than just observation and actually causes an unreasonable intrusion on the ground—most commonly from an
unreasonable amount of wind, dust, broken objects, noise, and sheer panic—then at some point courts are
compelled to step in and require a warrant.”).
318. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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perched in a high place to gain that view319 unless “the whole of [a person’s]
physical movements” are invaded.320
Only a fraction of states and a handful of local governments have enacted
laws regulating law enforcement’s use of UAS; of these, some still provide no
further protection than the Fourth Amendment.321 To date, there have been no
published court opinions addressing whether the use of UAS by local law
enforcement to conduct surveillance implicates the Fourth Amendment.322
However, the lower court decisions applying the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment doctrine to both manned aircraft and pole-top cameras demonstrate
there is no clear framework in place that can be consistently applied to the more
complicated issue of UAS.323 Because the Carpenter decision is so recent,324 it
is unclear how lower courts would apply the guideposts the Court offered for
determining whether an innovation in surveillance invades a constitutionally
protected area.
1.

Aerial Surveillance Using Helicopters

Since the decisions in Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, and Riley, state courts have
taken differing approaches in determining whether a search has occurred when
law enforcement uses helicopters to conduct aerial surveillance.325 Some courts
rely solely on whether the helicopter was in public airspace,326 holding the
search is reasonable if police are in a place “they have a right to be.”327 Other
state courts have relied on considering the intrusiveness of the search as
articulated by the Riley Court, including the duration of flight and whether it
created noise or wind, or otherwise interfered with the defendant’s use of the
property.328 A remaining group of states have articulated their own factors for
determining whether a search has occurred, such as giving weight to whether

319. Even fences do not provide a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes from
overhead surveillance. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (observing that respondent’s 10-foot
fence might not have shielded his marijuana plants from view of a policeman perched at a higher vantage point).
320. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
321. See supra Subparts I.D.2, I.D.3.
322. The Author conducted numerous searches using legal databases, the most recent on LexisAdvance on
November 16, 2018, searching all federal and state reported cases using search terms “drone or UAS and
surveillance and ‘Fourth Amendment.’” Cf. Scott Bomboy, A Legal Victory for Drones Warrants a Fourth
Amendment
Discussion,
NAT’L
CONST.
CTR.:
CONST.
DAILY
(Feb.
7,
2014),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/a-court-victory-for-drones-warrants-a-fourth-amendment-discussion
(reporting a state court case in North Dakota where the judge upheld the admission of evidence gathered by a
drone without a warrant).
323. See supra Subparts II.C.1, II.C.2.
324. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, was decided on June 22, 2108.
325. See State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467, 476 (Vt. 2008) (providing an overview of the different approaches
taken by state courts to aerial surveillance).
326. Id. (citing State v. Ainsworth, 801 P.2d 749, 750–52 (Or. 1990)); see also Commonwealth v. Oglialoro,
579 A.2d 1288, 1292 (Pa. 1990) (“As long as the police have the right to be where they are, and the activity is
clear and visible, the fact they are peering into curtilage is of no significance.”).
327. E.g., Ainsworth, 801 P.2d at 751.
328. Bryant, 950 A.2d at 478.
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“concentrating a surveillance on a particular place, as opposed to random
investigation to discover criminal activity” is justified.329 The state courts’
applications of the Supreme Court’s current aerial surveillance doctrine shows
the issue is far from settled.
Even within the same state, courts may still disagree on which test to use.
For example, in State v. Davis, the New Mexico state courts considered the
legality of a search where police used a helicopter to conduct aerial surveillance
looking for marijuana plants.330 The defendant was home and stated he heard a
helicopter flying low over his house and making “a considerable racket.”331 He
observed the helicopter about fifty feet “above his head ‘kicking up dust and
debris that was swirling all around.’”332 Nearby residents described the
helicopter flyovers as “terrifying and highly disruptive” and stated that the
downdraft caused physical damage to their properties.333 Both the Court of
Appeals of New Mexico and the New Mexico Supreme Court held the search
was unconstitutional, but they reached this conclusion on different bases.334
The New Mexico Court of Appeals applied Katz’s reasonable expectation
of privacy test and held the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because what was observed was in open view and the defendant’s expectation
of privacy from the air was unreasonable.335 However, the court held the search
violated New Mexico’s Constitution336 because the government intended to
obtain information through aerial surveillance that it could not have obtained
without a physical intrusion into the home or curtilage.337 The New Mexico
Supreme Court used an intrusion analysis and held that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment.338 The court held that when aerial surveillance by police
329. Id. at 478 (quoting Commonwealth v. One 1985 Ford Thunderbird Auto., 624 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Mass.
1993)).
330. 360 P.3d 1161, 1164 (N.M. 2015).
331. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1164–65.
334. Id. at 1172.
335. See State v. Davis, 321 P.3d 955, 959 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Davis, 360
P.3d 1161.
336. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue
without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing
of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”); see also Davis, 321 P.3d at 961 (“We fail to see how an
analysis of intrusiveness factors aids in the determination of whether an aerial surveillance is a search. The
privacy interest protected by Article II, Section 10 is not limited to one’s interest in a quiet and dust-free
environment. It also includes an interest in freedom from visual intrusion from targeted, warrantless police aerial
surveillance, no matter how quietly or cleanly the intrusion is performed.”).
337. Davis, 321 P.3d at 962.
338. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ suggestion to “move away from an
intrusion analysis in anticipation of future surveillance conducted by ‘ultra-quiet drones’ and other high-tech
devices.” Davis, 360 P.3d at 1172. But, because the case before the court involved surveillance only by
helicopters, it was “unnecessary to speculate about problems—and futuristic technology—that may or may not
arise in the future.” Id. Instead, the court decided to “reserve judgement and await a proper case with a developed
record.” Id.
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goes beyond a brief flyover and involves prolonged hovering close enough to
the ground to cause interference with the property, a search occurs.339 The court
concluded that the dust and disturbance caused by the helicopter demonstrated
that an unconstitutional intrusion under the Fourth Amendment had occurred,
making it unnecessary to consider whether the search also violated the state’s
constitution.340
2.

Aerial Surveillance Using Pole-Top Cameras

Pole-top cameras are similar to drones in that they are capable of observing
and recording from overhead and can be used without a physical trespass.341 The
lack of consensus regarding the constitutionality of surveillance using pole-top
cameras in lower courts foreshadows the likelihood that courts will be divided
when confronting UAS surveillance in the absence of clear guidance from
legislatures or the United States Supreme Court. Some courts have applied the
Katz test and held there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of
one’s home, which is violated when the government uses a camera to record
activity for an extended period of time.342 Other courts have held that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated when law enforcement uses a camera to record what
is exposed to public view,343 despite the length of the surveillance involved, even
while noting the government’s conduct was “highly intrusive.”344
In an early case involving the use of a pole-top camera to surveil a
suspected drug trafficker, the Fifth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment’s
protections extend to activities conducted in the defendant’s backyard.345
Federal agents had placed a camera on a utility pole that overlooked the 10-foothigh fence surrounding the defendant’s yard.346 The government argued that
339. Id.
340. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court inferred from California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), and
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment affords citizens no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance conducted in a disciplined manner—mere observation from navigable airspace of an
area left open to public view with minimal impact on the ground. It also seems, however, that
warrantless surveillance can go beyond benign observation in a number of different ways, one of
those being when surveillance creates a “hazard”—a physical disturbance on the ground or
unreasonable interference with a resident’s use of his property. In that case, surveillance more closely
resembles a physical invasion of privacy which has always been a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Davis, 360 P.3d at 1169.
341. See United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, at *2, *16 (E.D.
Wash. Dec. 15, 2014).
342. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250–51 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy when a camera was pointed at his backyard for eight weeks);
Vargas, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, at *16–17 (holding the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy when a camera was pointed at his front yard for six weeks).
343. United States v. Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 939 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
344. Id. at 936.
345. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251.
346. Id. at 250.
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under Ciraolo, it was not a search because portions of the yard were visible from
the street and a power company lineman on top of the pole or a policeman on
top of a truck could have peered over the fence.347 The court considered this
argument to be stretching Ciraolo “far beyond its natural reach” because the
intrusion was not a minimal, one-time overhead flight from 1,000 feet, but the
type of “indiscriminate video surveillance [that] raises the spectre of the
Orwellian state.”348 According to the court, the defendant’s expectation “to be
free from this type of video surveillance in his backyard is one that society is
willing to recognize as reasonable.”349 Indeed, the court characterized this type
of monitoring—recording all of the backyard activities for almost sixty days—
as provoking an “immediate negative visceral reaction,” opining that just
because a brief, one-time overhead flight was permissible under Ciraolo, it does
not follow that far more intrusive aerial surveillance is permissible.350
Similarly, a district court in Washington held that installing a pole-top
camera 150-feet away from the defendant’s home was a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes because “[t]he American people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the activities occurring in and around the front yard of
their homes particularly where the home is located in a very rural, isolated
setting.”351 Here, police installed a hidden camera on a telephone pole which
recorded everything in the defendant’s unfenced front yard and transmitted it to
the police station twenty miles away.352 Detectives could rotate and zoom the
camera remotely, controlling it via computer, and recorded continuously for six
weeks.353 Finding the trespassory test was not applicable because a physical
trespass did not occur, the court applied the reasonable expectation of privacy
test.354 The court ruled that given the invasive nature of the surveillance, whether
or not the front yard was included in the home’s curtilage was not controlling.355
The court distinguished the challenged surveillance from the observations
permitted in Ciraolo because the view the detective had in the instant case was
“so different in its intrusiveness that it does not qualify as a plain-view
observation.”356 The court determined that the defendant’s conduct over the six-

347. Id.
348. Id. at 250, 251.
349. Id. at 251 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit upheld the search here because the government had
obtained a court order and there was no evidence the government continued the surveillance after the proscribed
thirty-day period ended and before it obtained an extension. Id. at 252.
350. Id. at 251.
351. United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec.
15, 2014).
352. Id. at *6.
353. Id. at *6–7.
354. Id. at *16.
355. Id. at *17–18. The court did go on to apply the four factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294, 300 (1987), and hold that the defendant’s property here was curtilage. Id. at *19–22.
356. Id. at *27.
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week period manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.357 The court
reasoned that society expects law enforcement’s continuous and covert
surveillance of an individual’s front yard for such an extended period to be
judicially approved, and thus the objective prong of the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test was also satisfied.358 Acknowledging that the
surveillance would have passed Fourth Amendment muster if the officer himself
had actually sat atop the pole, the court observed that the likelihood of such an
effort going unnoticed by the defendant was remote.359
Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion and have upheld the
warrantless use of pole-top cameras because there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in an area that is exposed to public view.360 The defendant in one such
case argued that the camera actually trespassed by entering the premises for the
purposes of obtaining information, but the district court found this argument
lacking in merit because the camera was not installed on his property and there
can be no trespassory search without a trespass.361 The court also analyzed the
defendant’s claim that the government’s use of the camera violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy.362 Because it was a commercial property and
exposed to public view, the court held the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy.363 While the court opined about the “intrusive nature” of
the round-the-clock surveillance, with the camera recording continuously for
nearly five months, it concluded that, under current and prevailing law, the use
of long-term video surveillance to monitor the open and exposed commercial
property did not constitute a search.364
The First Circuit in United States v. Bucci also held that video surveillance
from a pole-top camera for a period of eight months did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even though the camera afforded law enforcement a view inside
the defendant’s garage when the door was open.365 Following this decision, a
district court in that circuit also held that warrantless surveillance using a pole-

357. Id. at *17. The court noted that the defendant used the yard for target practice and socializing with
friends and that the fact that one of the defendant’s guests urinated near the fence underscored the expectation
that it was a private activity. Id. at *20–21.
358. Id. at *17.
359. Id. at *26. The court commented, “Although having an agent sit on top of a telephone pole may seem
far afield, it is consistent with Justice Scalia’s ‘constable’ example in Jones.” Id. (citing United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 939–40 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
361. Id. at 938; see also id. at 936 (“Despite my considerable reservations about the failure of the officers
to have secured a warrant to conduct such highly intrusive surveillance, I conclude I must, in light of controlling
law, deny the motion [to suppress].”).
362. Id. at 938.
363. Id. at 939–40.
364. Id. at 942. Although the defendant testified he had been sleeping in a recreational vehicle on the
property for four months, the court characterized his testimony as “vague and uncertain” and determined the
property was commercial; thus, the defendant had a “diminished expectation of privacy in his activities there.”
Id. at 939.
365. 582 F.3d 108, 116–17 (1st Cir. 2009).
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top camera did not violate the Fourth Amendment,366 even though it considered
the approach and analysis of courts which had found a reasonable expectation
of privacy in such cases to be persuasive.367 In the district court case, the
defendant urged the court to adopt Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning in her
concurrence to Jones,368 in which she warned that the government’s ability to
“assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.”369
The defendant argued the pole-top camera captured more than what he exposed
to public view; it captured “the aggregate of all of his coming and going from
the home, . . . all types of intimate details of [his] life.”370 The court agreed the
surveillance was intrusive, acknowledging that “the pole camera was akin to
stationing a police officer at the front door by whom every person and object
must pass”371 and that the “secret nature of the surveillance prevent[ed] the target
from choosing to shield his behavior from public view.”372 Nonetheless, the
court held the search was constitutional because it was bound by First Circuit
precedent that there is no reasonable objective expectation of privacy when the
camera captures what is visible to the public.373
In light of the fact that lower courts disagree about whether warrantless
aerial surveillance for a prolonged period of time violates the Fourth
Amendment,374 there seems to be an inherent contradiction in policies advising
police officers to obtain a warrant when the Fourth Amendment requires it, or in
law enforcement agencies promising to self-police when a warrant is
necessary.375 If experienced judges who wrestle with constitutional questions on
a daily basis cannot know what is constitutional, how can law enforcement? For
example, current LAPD policy guidelines require officers to obtain a warrant
before using a drone “when required under the Fourth Amendment or other
provision of the law.”376 As one observer pointed out, LAPD’s policy “looks all
well and good, except that the Fourth Amendment and California law provide
little protection when it comes to aerial surveillance.”377

366. United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116312, at *27 (D.
Mass. Sept. 1, 2015).
367. Id. at *25.
368. Id. at *14–15.
369. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
370. Garcia-Gonzalez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116312, at *15.
371. Id. at *16.
372. Id. at *18.
373. Id. at *28–29 (citing United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108, 116–17 (1st Cir. 2009)).
374. See supra Subpart II.C.
375. See, e.g., MIKE DEWINE, OHIO ATTORNEY GEN., ADVISORY GROUP ON UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS 5 (2018), http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Publications-Files/Publications-for-LawEnforcement/Advisory-Group-on-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-Final; Douglass, supra note 71.
376. L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 70, at 3.
377. Matthew Feeney, LAPD Drones Threaten Privacy, CATO INST. (Oct. 17, 2017, 4:59 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/lapd-drones-threaten-privacy.
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Similarly, because the Ohio legislature failed to provide guidance,378 the
Ohio Attorney General created a model law enforcement policy with specific
recommendations for departments to develop and implement their own written
policies to address privacy concerns.379 It stated that “[l]aw enforcement
agencies should obtain a search warrant before any use where people would have
a reasonable expectation of privacy.”380 The ACLU criticized the model policy
and regulations as “inadequate” because they fail to “address the potential for
widespread or around-the-clock surveillance.”381 The ACLU noted that under
current case law, there is virtually no reasonable expectation of privacy once a
person sets foot outside their home.382
Thus, policies advising police officers to obtain a warrant before using a
drone “where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy”383 offer
only circular logic and little practical guidance. Because drone surveillance is
unlikely to involve a physical trespass, courts would likely apply the Katz test.
Even the limited protection the Katz test might afford could diminish over time.
As Justice Alito noted in his partial concurrence in Jones, the reasonable
expectation of privacy test “involves a degree of circularity”384 because
technology changes what society expects and will accept as reasonable. The
increasing popularity of drones with law enforcement and non-governmental
actors may erode the public’s privacy expectations as they become more
commonly seen in the airspace, altering whether society is prepared to recognize
a person’s expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable.385 If law
enforcement is permitted to use technology to increase public safety at the
expense of privacy, the public may come to view the intrusion as inevitable.386
III. THE SOLUTION: STATE-BASED STANDARDS
A. STATE LEGISLATURES ARE IN THE BEST POSITION TO SAFEGUARD
PRIVACY AND PRESERVE UAS AS A TOOL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
Legislation regulating law enforcement’s use of UAS should be enacted at
the state level, as an exercise of the states’ police power. Reliance on
administrative policies to safeguard individual privacy387 or on law enforcement
378. Barrie Barber, Ohio Gives Police Agencies Guidelines on Drone Use, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Jan. 29,
2018),
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/ohio-gives-police-agencies-guidelines-drone-use/
zpg7zCSnaEbYwCqFQkKxqK (“It was an emerging issue that there was no model policy in Ohio.”) (quoting a
spokesman for the attorney general)).
379. DEWINE, supra note 375.
380. Id. at 5.
381. Barber, supra note 378.
382. Id.
383. DEWINE, supra note 375, at 5.
384. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
385. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
386. Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
387. See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 36, at 12 (noting the potential for institutional abuse of surveillance
technology by government agencies).
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to police itself is an insufficient safeguard for Fourth Amendment freedoms.388
Cases applying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to technology-based
surveillance have produced inconsistent results, as the pole-top camera cases
demonstrate.389 Drone technology is advancing at such a rapid rate390 that any
court decisions analyzing whether surveillance goes too far and becomes a
search would likely be outdated by the time an opinion is rendered.391 As a free
society, we are dependent upon our civil liberties,392 which are threatened by
law enforcement’s ability to engage in “mass tracking” of Americans, absent
any evidence of wrongdoing.393 Civil liberties are too important to wait decades
for the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to catch up to UAS. In light of the unique
capabilities of drone technology and the privacy interests at stake, the public
should look to the law to provide clear boundaries for permissible governmental
use of drone technology.394
The federal government has failed to address privacy concerns with respect
to drones, despite requests from privacy advocates as early as 2012.395 Congress
is divided as to whether the federal government or states are the appropriate actor
to enact legislation regulating law enforcement’s use of drones, with some
viewing it as a question of federalism.396 Even if Congress could successfully
pass legislation regulating this issue, such regulation would likely be challenged
by those who view it as the federal government overstepping its constitutionally

388. See Kathryn Watson, What Is the Future of Privacy, Surveillance and Policing Technologies Under
Trump?, CBS NEWS (June 22, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/future-of-privacy-surveillanceand-policing-technologies-trump (citing comments of Matthew Feeney, a policy analyst at the Cato Institute).
389. See supra Subpart II.C.2.
390. STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 36, at 4.
391. UAVs can be equipped with:
[I]ncreasingly powerful lenses that allow significant zooming, increasing the chance that individuals
will come under scrutiny from faraway aircraft without knowing it. And the density of photo sensors
is growing at an exponential pace (in line with Moore’s law), allowing for higher and higher
resolution photos to be taken for the same price camera.
ACLU, supra note 109, at 5 (citing Nathan Myhrvold, Moore’s Law Corollary: Pixel Power, N.Y. TIMES (June
7, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/07/technology/circuits/07essay.html). Moore’s law stands for the
proposition that the power of computers doubles every two years. Id. Applying this to digital cameras, the
technology will continue to advance at such a rate that court decisions will always be based on outdated
assumptions.
392. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 24 (1972) (Douglas. J., dissenting).
393. Marguerite Rigoglioso, Civil Liberties and Law in the Era of Surveillance, STAN. LAW. (Nov. 13,
2014), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/civil-liberties-and-law-in-the-era-of-surveillance (citing
comments of Catherine Crump, staff attorney for the ACLU).
394. See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 36, at 15.
395. See Petition to Michael P. Huerta, Acting Adm’r, Fed. Aviation Admin. (Feb. 24, 2012),
https://epic.org/apa/lawsuit/EPIC-FAA-Drone-Petition-March-8-2012.pdf (petitioning the FAA to “conduct a
rulemaking to address the threat to privacy and civil liberties that will result from the deployment of aerial drones
within the United States”).
396. See, e.g., Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 631, 115th Cong. (2017); Drone
Federalism Act of 2017, S. 1272, 115th Cong. (2017); Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act of
2013, S. 1016, 113th Cong. (2013); Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972,
113th Cong. (2013); Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act of 2013, S. 1016, 113th Cong. (2013).
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prescribed role397 and regulating an area left to the states under federalist
principles.398 Privacy is an area traditionally related to state and local police
power,399 and has only been subject to federal regulation in limited
circumstances.400 Further, any federal legislation would likely be criticized as a
one-size-fits-all solution for states with differing constitutional privacy
protections (which reflect their constituents’ differing views of privacy)401 and
geography.402
Nor would regulation on the local level prove effective. Allowing local
municipalities to regulate law enforcement’s use of drones would create an
inconsistent patchwork of regulations, which could not only impair safety in the
NAS but would wreak havoc on reasonable expectations of privacy. For
example, it would not be reasonable to expect the average resident of Seattle to
know whether a city an hour away, which he or she might visit occasionally,
permits warrantless drone surveillance, unlike the robust protection that same
person enjoyed at home.403 Also, consider the issue of an individual on the
outskirts of a locality where warrantless drone surveillance is prohibited, yet the
neighboring police department could record that person’s movements from a

397. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1985) (“[T]he composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress.”).
398. Scott Gaylord, Opinion, States Need More Control over the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/07/16/state-politics-vs-the-federal-government/states-needmore-control-over-the-federal-government?mcubz=0 (last updated July 17, 2013, 8:54 AM) (citing states’
challenges to the Affordable Care Act and various actions of the Environmental Protection Agency); see also
Hall, supra note 162, at 2.
399. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42064, 42194 (June
28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, 183) (“[L]aws traditionally related
to State and local police power—including land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law enforcement operations—
generally are not subject to Federal regulation.”). Interestingly, this exact language was quoted by the federal
district court in Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125, 130 (D. Mass. 2017), even though it struck down
portions of a city ordinance regulating drones because the ordinance was preempted by a federal regulation, id.
at 133. Some have criticized the opinion as flawed, because it relied on a provision in the U.S. Code that was
miscodified to conclude that “Congress extensively controls much of the field,” and relied on an amorphous
definition of “national airspace.” Stephen Migala, A Critical Review of the 1st Drone Preemption Case, LAW360
(Dec.
1,
2017,
12:50
PM),
https://www.law360.com/publicpolicy/articles/
989147?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=section (citing Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 129).
400. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012) (regulating the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of personal information collected by the federal government).
401. For example, Hawaii’s Supreme Court has rejected the third-party doctrine as inconsistent with the
privacy protection afforded in article 1, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution. State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 901
(Haw. 2014). In comparison, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed in both United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) that an individual has no expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily conveyed to a third party. In Walton, the Hawaii Supreme Court also observed that
drones may soon become too numerous to sustain a claim of expectation of privacy, further highlighting the
need for states to protect privacy rights. Id. at 907 n.27.
402. See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 869 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Because the geography of the United
States is not homogenous, the rights of citizens that live in its different parts cannot be viewed as a uniform,
seamless web.”). Thus, searches that are permissible in some areas would not be permissible in others, because
uniformity would not be in the public’s interest. See id.
403. See Seattle Adopts Nation’s Strongest Regulations for Surveillance Technology, supra note 211.
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significant distance away. This would defeat the locality’s intention with the
warrant requirement and still permit a surveillance society in other areas.
Such uncertainty about whether or not there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a given locality could result in people changing their behavior.404 As
Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in Jones: “Awareness that the
government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”405
Relying on local regulations that create an inconsistent patchwork would create
fluctuating expectations of privacy, could have a chilling effect on behavior, and
would create gaps where the public might have less privacy protection than they
believe.
In addition, the few measures enacted by local governments thus far have
been largely reactionary, excluding UAS for all uses, including those that are
beneficial or even innocuous.406 Such measures foreclose the use of drones to
perform the numerous law enforcement tasks they are uniquely well-suited for,
as outlined in Part I. Some local measures have also foreclosed the use of drones
to help keep the public safe at events with large crowds, such as music
festivals407 or sporting events like marathons.408 As one critic of such
overprotective measures observed, allowing police to use drones in those
situations would place little or no burden on privacy because such events take
place in public, there are numerous spectators photographing the event, and the
event may even be televised.409 Thus, people in cities like Syracuse and Seattle
are likely less safe, because law enforcement has been deprived of a tool that
could enhance public safety.
Thus, states are in the best position to balance the constitutional rights of
the public against public safety because state legislatures are closer to the people
they represent than the federal government but large enough to avoid the
patchwork problem. States also have “greater resources and greater ability to
mobilize public attention” than local governments, because of “their relatively
larger size and fewer numbers.”410 The enactment of state UAS statutes will
promote administrative efficiencies in courts, which will become familiar with

404. See ACLU, supra note 109, at 7 (noting that people tend to behave differently when they are being
watched).
405. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
406. See supra Subpart I.D.3.
407. See Brown, supra note 46 (discussing the use of UAS by police in Dover to monitor the Firefly Music
Festival); Bruce Fessier, Coachella Using Drones, Security Plans Enacted After 9/11 to Prevent Las Vegas-Type
Incident, DESERT SUN, https://www.desertsun.com/story/life/entertainment/music/coachella/2018/04/04/
coachella-using-drones-security-plans-enacted-after-9-11-prevent-another-las-vegas-type-incident/487502002/
(last updated Apr. 4, 2018, 4:09 PM) (discussing the Indio Police Department’s contract with independent drone
operators to provide additional security at an outdoor music festival).
408. McNeal, supra note 170, at 3 (“[A] marathon is the type of event where the police would want to use
a drone to monitor for unknown attackers, and in the unfortunate event of an attack, use the footage to identify
the perpetrators.”).
409. Id. at 4.
410. Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1349 (1994).
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the statutes’ parameters. Additionally, state laws will provide clear guidelines to
law enforcement agencies ex ante, so they do not expend resources gathering
evidence that could be thrown out when a court analyzes the legality of the
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment or the state’s equivalent.
In other areas of privacy, states have proven to be effective and important
laboratories for experimenting with remedies411 because they have been the first
to identify areas in need of regulation and to act, offering innovative solutions
which allow simultaneous experiments with different policies.412 As Justice
Brandeis famously observed, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”413 Thus far, many states have tried and failed to pass drone
legislation, while others, such as Oregon, have enacted a law that vigorously
protects privacy. Invariably, some states may be slow to respond to this
emerging issue, while others may take an even more forward-thinking and
innovative approach. In either event, the states’ role as laboratories of
democracy should not be usurped. As Justice O’Connor noted, “the . . .
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . . liberty
interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . in the first instance.”414
B. MODEL PROPOSAL
States should enact drone legislation that adequately addresses the privacy
concerns of individuals and allows the public to benefit from law enforcement’s
use of drones. Factors to consider when tailoring legislation to the state’s unique
needs are geography, public views on privacy and safety, and state constitutional
protections. Safeguards must be in place regulating when and where drones can
be used, limiting data retention to specific periods of time based on how and
why the data is collected, and restricting the tools that may be added to drone
platforms to avoid the Orwellian surveillance state that privacy advocates fear.
Legislation should not merely create a blanket warrant requirement that unduly
burdens drone use and may actually reduce public safety. Rather, the focus
should be on the danger that drones present—the possibility of pervasive
surveillance and warehousing of data against individuals.415 Accordingly, this
Note recommends416 the following be incorporated into any state drone
legislation:
411. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 51, at 1660 (noting that after California passed a data breach notification
law, forty-six other states followed suit). “Action in one prominent state or a handful of states on surveillance
policy . . . could lead to a similar snowball effect.” Id.
412. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 916–18 (2009).
413. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
414. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
415. McNeal, supra note 170, at 2.
416. The Author relied on Oregon’s robust statute as a starting point for her recommendations. See OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 837.310–.345 (2017).

K - BENTLEY_20 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2018]

1.

POLICING THE POLICE

1/19/2019 11:31 AM

293

Section 1: Limits on Law Enforcement Use of Drones

Law enforcement agencies are prohibited from using drones except:
(1) when a warrant is issued authorizing drone use, specifying the period of
operation which is not to exceed fourteen days but is renewable by the court
upon motion and showing of good cause; (2) when the agency has probable
cause to believe there has been or will be a crime and exigent circumstances
exist which make it unreasonable to obtain a warrant authorizing drone
use; (3) during sporting events, concerts, rallies, or other events where
attendance is expected to exceed 10,000 persons, drones may be used during the
period twelve hours prior to the event through four hours past its conclusion;
(4) when an individual gives written consent; (5) for search and rescue activities;
(6) for assisting an individual during an emergency if the agency believes there
is imminent threat to life or safety of the individual; (7) for preserving public
safety, private property, or assessing environmental or weather related damage
during a state emergency that is declared by the governor; (8) for purposes of
crime scene reconstruction or accident investigation; or (9) for training
exercises.
For (2) above, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that
exigent circumstances did exist and in no case shall exigent circumstances
authorize drone use for a period which exceeds eight hours. Any data that is
obtained in violation of the statute, including during training exercises, crime
scene reconstruction, or accident investigation, cannot be used to establish
probable cause and is not admissible in any court proceeding, except as provided
by Section 2.
2.

Section 2: Limits on Data Retention

The following limitations apply to data retention: (1) Data collected
pursuant to a warrant may be retained for a period of up to five years, after which
time, the data must be deleted permanently; (2) Data that is not collected
pursuant to a warrant, but is incidental to activities two through seven in Section
One is accessible to law enforcement agencies for a period of up to sixty days
and treated as a contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous observation;
(3) After sixty days, data collected pursuant to activities two through seven in
Section One must be moved to a server and stored for a period of no more than
five years from the date of collection (retention period to coincide with the
period for data obtained with a warrant). Such information may only be retrieved
by law enforcement pursuant to a court order upon a showing of probable cause.
At the end of the allotted retention period, the data must be permanently deleted;
(4) Data collected for purposes of crime scene investigation and accident
reconstruction may only be used in the scope of those particular accidents or
crimes. Any data inadvertently captured during the course of such activities
which pertains to other, unrelated criminal activity may be preserved by court
order issued within sixty days of the date the data was collected and is admissible
in a court proceeding.
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Section 3: Limits on Technology Placed on the Drone Platform

Except when used in accordance with Section One to conduct surveillance
at an event where attendance is expected to exceed 10,000 persons, or, to
conduct search and rescue activities, drones may not be used as a platform for
sense-enhancing technology that is not in general public use without a warrant.
Under no circumstances may law enforcement agencies weaponize drones, even
with non-lethal force.
C. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL PROPOSAL
Drones allow police to conduct surveillance and stockpile data at a fraction
of the cost of traditional surveillance methods, so laws must safeguard the public
and act as a barrier against the threat of a surveillance society. These
recommendations will allow law enforcement to use drones to increase public
safety, such as by providing an eye in the sky during events which pose a
heightened security risk or threat of terrorist attack, or, to conduct search and
rescue missions without endangering officers’ lives. However, the data retention
limits, warrant requirement, and time limitation on exigent circumstances should
prevent law enforcement from abusing this powerful platform and using it for
dragnet surveillance.
The purpose of the warrant requirement in Section 1 is to address the
intrusive nature of drone surveillance by securing the privacies of life and
placing obstacles in the way of pervasive surveillance.417 Strict limits on what
constitutes exigent circumstances and the maximum period warrantless
surveillance may be conducted in exigent circumstances also serve these ends.
Similarly, prohibiting the use of data obtained during training exercises, accident
investigation, or crime scene reconstruction (with limited exceptions) in
criminal proceedings will deter police from engaging in these legitimate
activities as a pretext for evidence gathering.
The data retention limits in Section 2 will specifically address public
concern about the potential for aggregating large amounts of data as they will
preclude law enforcement from mining the data without a warrant or court order.
The maximum period that data gathered pursuant to a warrant may be retained
should be determined by the individual legislature and should bear some
relevance to the statute of limitations on most crimes. Foreclosing evidence
gathered in violation of the rules from being used in any court proceeding will
encourage law enforcement to either obtain a warrant or rely on traditional
means of investigation which are less intrusive.
Allowing law enforcement to use drones before, during, and immediately
after large-scale events will increase public safety without intruding into a
constitutionally protected area because there is no expectation of privacy at such
an event. Section 3 permits UAS to carry sense-enhancing technology such as
facial recognition software and license plate readers only in limited
417. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).
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circumstances. This will increase public safety by helping law enforcement
identify threats at large-scale events more quickly, serving as a deterrent to
criminal activity, and aiding in prosecutions. However, limiting the use of senseenhancing technology further prevents law enforcement from gathering and
aggregating large amounts of data to be stockpiled and used against individuals
at a later date.
CONCLUSION
With the advent of drones, the natural limits on law enforcement’s ability
to conduct widespread aerial surveillance are disappearing. Law enforcement
cannot be expected to police itself and determine the appropriate uses and limits
of this powerful tool. While the Fourth Amendment provides the baseline
protection against warrantless searches, current jurisprudence likely provides no
protection from warrantless drone surveillance. Instead, individuals must look
to the government to provide firm laws which balance the beneficial uses of
drone technology against the weighty privacy interests at stake.
States, as laboratories of democracy, are the most suitable actors to enact
laws to serve as guardrails for law enforcement and regulate their use of drones.
Without clear guidance from the states, local law enforcement agencies and
communities will create an ad hoc patchwork of rules and policies that will
compromise overall expectations of privacy and lead to inconsistent results from
one city or county to the next. This inconsistent patchwork may not only make
the NAS less safe, as the FAA fears, it will jeopardize public safety because
beneficial drone use by law enforcement will be prohibited in some areas. Thus,
states should enact clear regulations that preserve the beneficial uses of drones
as a tool in the hands of law enforcement.
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